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Introductory Background Notes 
1999 “National Symposium, The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation” 
Into a world in which virtually every major interest group, including business, 
labor, human rights, religious, policy makers, criminal justice interests, the 
general public, and economists all either opposed inmates participating in the 
civilian labor force or tolerated it without complaint, the 1999 “National 
Symposium” presents - however tentatively given- perhaps the first modern 
economic argument ​for​ integrating inmates into the normal US labor force.  And it 
did so involving highly prominent US labor economists from left to right, probably 
to the mutual surprise and discomfort of all participants. 
 Like others, my economic views on inmate labor arise from many sources, but 
among them three stand out, namely (1) my efforts to reconcile inmate labor 
policies with my education, that is, my understanding of the broader body of 
western microeconomic theory and history, (2) the theoretical work of 1992 Nobel 
economist Gary Becker’s work on discrimination, which saw discrimination as 
refusing to use otherwise productive people – able to competitively produce 
dollar-valued goods and services – because of the greater psychic value of denying 
them work; and (3) the work of Texas A&M economist Morgan Reynolds, who is 
the first economist in my experience arguing ​for​ business use of prison labor for 
the good of the overall economy. 
Dawning for me was extraordinarily slow- from at least 1986 into 1999 - and 
further proof, I think, of the tremendous  difficulty a priori in perceiving or 
recognizing discrimination, despite a posteriori, afterwards, its seeming 
obviousness all along. It reminds me today of the phenomenal difficulty inherent in 
thinking differently from all others around. 
Having finally achieved my PhD in 1986, and despite my career turning away from 
prisoner statistics in 1979 to energy, I continued mulling about US prison labor 
going forward. I had been greatly blessed by the National Correctional Industries 
Association as observer to the National Work Group on inmate labor, a 
collaborative of prison industry stakeholders and opponents wrestling over inmate 
labor issues, thereby giving me the opportunity of hearing debates by stakeholders 
of the underlying issues.  By 1998, however, I’d begun to suspect that the real 1
problem in US prison labor was not the “normal” economy, but in fact the 
accumulation of ​differences​ from the normal economy that constituted US prison 
labor  primarily providing discrimination benefits to arguing stakeholders.  In fact, 
it began to dawn on me that what I was really observing was an ongoing tug 
among warring stakeholders for each gaining upper hands benefits from extracting 
preferred benefits from differential treatment of unprotected incarcerated workers, 
who continued to be treated primarily as not really needing money in the first 
place. 
Thanks to an amazing opportunity afforded by a Soros grant from the Open Society 
Institute, we then were able to contract four prominent economists known for their 
wider expertise and with no known views on prison labor, and to obtain their view 
on whether the US economy – really GDP – would be better served if inmates were 
welcomed or excluded from the US labor force. 
The four economists engaged were – 
1.  Ray Marshall, University of Texas, former Carter secretary of labor and 
well known economist on race discrimination; 
2. Alan Krueger, Princeton, later Obama administration chair, Council of 
Economic Advisors (joined by Jeffrey Kling); 
3. Richard Freeman, Harvard, prominent labor economist; and 
4. Steven Levitt, U. Chicago, more recently of “Freakonomics” fame. 
Professor Levitt was recommended to us by Gary Becker. 
Study Suggestion:   Conclusions barely emerge from individual presentations, but 
become clearer as the day’s interactions proceed and authors and reviewers 
reflect.  Therefore I suggest not stopping at reading each speaker’s presentation, 
but to continue through the Q&A’s as well as closing observations. 
1 I remain tremendously grateful to the National Correctional Industries Association and to US prison industries 
practitioners, whom I see as dedicated public servants trapped in an ossified and inherently failed social structure. 
Finally, even in my own case, the clarity of conclusions did not snap into place 
until some months later.  And, while not disavowed, my impression is that neither 
the Open Society Institute or the speakers themselves found the topic – despite its 
breakthrough content – a lucrative or fruitful field for further pursuit. 
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Most objections to jail and prison inmate open-market employment are fundamentally 
either economic or criminal justice objections.  The May 21, 1999 National symposium, 
“The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation,” addresses the root economic 
question, whether allowing inmates to compete for (participate in) open market jobs is 
good or bad for the economy.  Except for briefly touching on recidivism and 
rehabilitative effects, the project does not address criminal justice issues relating to 
inmate employment. 
 
For the symposium, prominent mainstream U.S. economists provide introductory 
opinions and propose economically beneficial general policy directions for inmate labor 
force participation.  The symposium also includes panelist views representing 
stakeholders affected by inmate labor policies, plus limited feedback from symposium 
participants. 
 
The symposium was funded by the Center on Crime, Communities & Culture of the 
Open Society Institute (OSI) as part of its efforts spurring public debate on important 
issues affecting crime, poverty, and inner cities.  
 
The event was hosted by the George Washington University Department of Economics, 




Either by law or custom, inmates in U.S. jails and prisons are barred from open-market 
jobs.  In addition to state prohibitions, the most stringent Federal restriction, the 
Sumners-Ashurst Act of 1948, prohibits the transport of prison-made goods in interstate 
commerce.  Although a succession of Federal and state changes, beginning with “The 
Percy Amendment” in 1979,” allow inmates to hold open market jobs under specified 
conditions, fewer than 3,000 of the nation’s 1.8 million local, state, and Federal adult 
inmates held open market jobs in 1998.   About 600 thousand work in prison upkeep or in 1
1 Excluding about 40,000 inmates estimated to be on work release near the ends of their sentences.  Source 
for inmate employment: draft, “Inmate Labor in America’s Correctional Facilities, A Preliminary Report of 
traditional prison industries serving government purchasers.  Inmates working in 
traditional prison industries go unpaid or receive small gratuities, usually far less than a 
dollar an hour. 
 
Current arguments, particularly as articulated by business, organized labor, and human 
rights groups, generally oppose inmates holding open-market jobs.  Primary objections 
arise from a criminal justice perspective (Unemployment is “good punishment”), for 
reasons of human rights (Prison labor is exploitative or abusive), or on economic grounds 
(Inmate employment takes jobs from civilian labor, is exploitative or abusive, and drives 
down the civilian wage rate).  
 
Privately-owned industries oppose prison industries – and by extension, inmate 
employment – primarily because prison industries receive advantages (subsidies) not 
available to taxpaying firms, including exclusive rights to government markets, taxpayer 
provided land and capital equipment, exemption from taxes and regulation, and 
exemption from virtually all pay and benefits for the incarcerated labor force. 
 
Organized labor generally opposes inmate labor on economic grounds, seeing the 
involuntary, unpaid, and unprotected inmate labor force – whose living costs are paid by 
taxpayers - as unfairly competing against civilian labor.  Unions also oppose using inmate 
labor as strike breakers or to otherwise weaken unions, and they oppose prisons abusing 
the labor force with coercion, low or no pay or benefits, reduced conditions of safety and 
protection, and utter powerlessness (including a prohibition against union membership). 
 
Human rights groups, such as the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, generally oppose prison labor as a form of slavery, exploitation, and abuse. 
Further, human rights groups are particularly concerned that the state will use inmate 
earnings to fund additional expansion of the U.S. prison system. 
 
Others see gains in inmate work.  Foremost, corrections agencies strongly prefer inmate 
work to (1) cost-effectively reduce idleness – and prison violence, and (2) educate and 
rehabilitate inmates.  Interestingly, unionized prison staff tend to prefer inmate work for 
the sake of improved inmate morale and safety, and thereby temper broader union 
opposition.  Representatives of inmates often favor the education, training, discipline, and 
income – however slight – offered by work.  And some argue that it is not employment 
but inmate unemployment that harms the economy, by reducing National output, 
reducing consumer opportunities and raising prices, decreasing civilian job opportunities 
and slowing employment growth, increasing welfare and taxes, and undermining both the 
economic welfare and the social fabric of low-income homes and communities, 
especially inner cities.  They see inmates’ absence subtracting about 2 percent from the 
male labor force, de facto denying compensation to crime victims, leaving more 
unsupported minor children of inmates than inmates (about 2.2 million), shifting the 
the American Bar Association’s Subcommittee on Correctional Industries,”  Washington, D.C., April, 
1998.  Source for inmate population: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 
“Prisoners in 1998,”  NCJ 175687, Washington, D.C., August, 1998.  
financial burden of supporting inmates and their children to taxpayers and about 1 million 
mostly lower income females (the mothers and grandmothers of inmates’ children), and 
creating “unemployment” equaling 20 percent or more of the poorest neighborhood’s 
minority male populations.  They see inmate and inmate family poverty reducing the 
demand for goods and services, thereby reducing civilian employment and costing the 
Nation hundreds of thousands of civilian jobs.  They also see inmate unemployment 
spawning conditions for future crime. 
 
To date, inmate open-market employment has been minimal.  Enabling legislation, 
overseen by the Federal “Prison Industry Enhancement Certification”  (PIE) program, 
now allows private firms to use state and local inmate labor if the employment is 
voluntary, it pays locally “prevailing wages,” does not displace existing civilian 
employment, requires consultations with business and organized labor, and imposes 
deductions from inmate earnings for taxes, victims compensation, board and room, and 
child and family support.  About 40 states now permit inmates to hold open-market jobs 
under PIE requirements.  Yet after more than twenty years, fewer than 3000 inmates - 
about two tenths of one percent of the Nation’s 1,800,000 jail and prison populations - 
hold open-market jobs.  And many of those jobs are hotly contested, with private 
businesses arguing that prison-facilitated firms are, in fact, displacing existing civilian 
employees and firms. 
 
Further, while enlightening and illustrating stakeholder good will, an ongoing series of 
meetings, working groups, and forums on the subject has little budged public policies or 
noticeably softened debate.   Action on inmate employment appears stalled. 2
 
Therefore, in order to gain deeper understanding of at least some critical facets of the 
debate, and in order to spur more effective debate and policy change, more intense focus 
on clarifying economic aspects of inmate labor policies was devised. 
 




Believing that (1) economic issues are central to the debate, (2) non economic aspects 
could be better understood if economic aspects were clearly distinguished, and that (3) 
entangling economics with other issues is a common source of confusion, the symposium 
and these written opinions on “The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation,” 
were designed to focus on economic features of inmate labor. 
 
Other critical design features include - 
 
2 Recent ongoing groups include the American Bar Association Correctional Industries Subcommittee and 
the National Working Group on Inmate Labor (NWGIL); National meetings of the Correctional Industries 
Association (CIA) and the American Correctional Association and the May, 1998, “National Prison 
Industries Forum” in Washington, D.C. showcase recent debates on prison industries and inmate labor. 
● The basis for judging “good” or “bad” is​ competitive economic theory and 
experience​, accepting the objectives (primarily maximizing production of 
goods and services), means, and analytic tools of conventional Western 
economics.  Positions reflecting a general opposition to the competitive model 
are excluded; for example, Marxist labor views would not be persuasive in the 
symposium setting. 
 
● Economists are chosen for their ​general prominence​ in mainstream economics 
and not for views on inmate labor force participation.   The choice reflects an 
intent to view inmate labor primarily as a standard economic issue. 
 
● The process intends to be ​objective​ and ​neutral​, beginning with the questions 
asked and the economists invited, and accepting whatever outcomes occur, so 
long as they emanate from competitive mainstream economics.  For example, 
no economist was identified, interviewed, or chosen based on any declared or 
presumed position on inmate labor force participation.  
 
● The primary focus is on ​persons​ as economic participants and not on 
institutions, that is, on the labor force participation of persons who are 
incarcerated, and not on the prison industrial structure in which employment 
occurs. 
 
● The principal focus is on ​labor force participation​, that is, the right to 
compete for employment, and not on the right to have jobs or to be “given” 
jobs. 
 
● The focus is ​overall economic consequences ​and​ ​not criminal justice effects; 
therefore, the focus is on national output, income, and employment, as well as 
on broader economic consequences for major affected groups.  
 
In sum, the design differs from typical debate in that it treats inmate labor as a standard 
economic issue in the broad context of general economic efficiency and not as a criminal 
justice or correctional issue.  Therefore, economic consequences for Gross Domestic 
Product, employment, prices, and income are of greater importance to this presentation 
than traditional features such as prison order, rehabilitation, and compensation.  By 
extension, the design emphasizes broader classes of economic winners and losers not 
traditionally identified or considered in inmate labor debate. 
 
Throwing the issue of inmate employment into the general sphere of economics has the 
additional advantages of (1) setting the debate into a context and broader experience 
familiar to many, and (2) making the issue of inmate labor addressable by a far wider 
body of expertise than traditionally involved.   Both for learning and for political utility, 
public policy makers, opinion makers, journalists, corrections and correctional industry 
representatives, and stakeholders of every stripe can turn to local universities, economic 
research groups, think tanks, and others for assessments, insights, and guidance on the 
issue of inmate work, all while providing stakeholders from many sectors a common 
ground for review, analysis, and communication. 
 
Although not originally highlighted, effects on future crime and recidivism became a 
prominent feature of the ​economic​ discussion, in the context of the economic costs and 
benefits of reducing future crime. 
 
● A secondary objective of the effort is to entice the economics profession into 
more extensively examining issues of inmate labor and prison industries. 
Therefore, recognizing that the selected economists are not specialists in the 
area, their views for the symposium should be seen as ​introductory opinions 
clearly subject to additional insight and modification. 
 
Recruiting economists began in late 1998 and concluded in January 1999.  In March, the 
George Washington University (GWU) Department of Economics agreed to host the 
symposium and monitor interactions with the economists.  The economists exchanged 
first drafts in late March and April; CRS staff briefly joined the interchange in late April, 
asking questions and recommending clarifications, in all cases monitored by GWU. 
 
Two additional features joined the symposium late in the process.  First, in order to 
represent key stakeholders within a tight schedule, the symposium added a panel of 
expert stakeholders, including of taxpayers, children and families, minorities, women, 
inmates, prison industries, business, and labor (Representatives of victims and the elderly 
were invited).  Stakeholders were invited to represent the effects of actual and proposed 
inmate labor policies on constituencies of importance.  Second, although interactive 
discussion among participants was always anticipated, professional facilitation services 
were added in early Spring.  
 
The symposium was moderated by Amy Kaslow, an independent broadcast journalist on 
national and international economics issues.  Ms. Kaslow is a regular contributor to 
National Public Radio’s “Marketplace”; from 1989 to 1996, Ms. Kaslow was the lead 





Each economist was asked to explicitly address four questions: 
 
1. Applying your economic specialty, and separate from any criminal justice 
costs or benefits, are bans on prison inmate labor force participation “good” or 
“bad” for the U.S. economy?  Please explain, identifying economic winners 
and losers, and state your opinion of the net overall economic gain or loss to 
the economy, along with any important limitations on the opinion.  3
3 “Good” or “bad” came to be interpreted as with respect to output of material goods and services as 
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), though its intended meaning by CRS staff was to distinguish 
 
2. Specifically, from your economic specialty, will expanded inmate 
participation in the economy create, destroy, or have no effect on civilian 
employment in the United States?  Explain. 
 
3. Applying your economic specialty, what steps are essential to improve the 
economic contribution of the incarcerated labor force? 
 
4. If there are any criminal justice or correctional effects distinguishable from 
economic aspects, please identify and explain them, particularly their effects 




material goods and services from immaterial economic “goods” such as  the satisfaction from 
discrimination, punishment, or preference for dealing with some persons over others. 
 
The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation 
 
May 29, 1999 
The George Washington University 




Presentation by Ray Marshall 
Preliminary Opinion on the Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation 
Biography 
Ray Marshall is Professor Emeritus and Audre and Bernard Rapoport Centennial Chair in 
Economics and Public Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the 
University of Texas at Austin.  Professor Marshall served four years as U.S. Secretary of 
Labor in the Carter Administration. 
 
Professor Marshall has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at 
Berkeley.  A member of the University of Texas faculty since 1962, he came to the LBJ 
School in 1981.  He is a founder and member of the board of the Economic Policy 
Institute.  He is a member of the Clinton Administration’s Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations, co-chair of the Commission on the Skills of the 
American Workforce, chair of the board of the National Center on Education and the 
Economy, and past President of the International Labor Rights Fund. 
 
Professor Marshall has authored more than thirty books and monographs, including 
Thinking for a Living, Education and the Wealth of Nations, Losing Direction, ​and 
Families, Human Resources, and Economic Development. 
 








This paper addresses the following priority questions on the economics of inmate 
labor force participation (ILFP) presented in the guidelines for this project: 
1. Are bans on ILFP good or bad for the economy in terms of impact on the GDP? 
2. What effect will the expansion of ILFP have on civilian unemployment? 
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3. What are the key steps in improving the economic contributions of the inmate labor 
force? 
4. What non-economic (e.g., criminal justice, correctional or other) effects should be 
addressed regarding ILFP? 
My responses to these questions are: 
1)  The overall effects of ILFP on the economy and the work force are likely to be 
relatively small and therefore less important, at least in the short run, than an 
examination of the effects of the expansion of ILFP on particularly affected groups: 
the inmates, their families and victims; workers, unions and companies in industries 
most heavily impacted by ILFP; the criminal justice system; and the general public. I 
have been asked to pay particular attention to the views of organized labor on ILFP. 
2)  The appropriate standard for assessing the impact of ILFP on the economy and 
particular groups should be the social benefits and costs of particular measures taken 
to expand ILFP. In other words, the appropriate policy question should be to seek a 
set of policies that will expand or contract ILFP while achieving specified public 
policy options and minimizing adverse effects for free labor markets. Expanding GDP 
is not, by itself, likely to be a significant policy objective; ILFP is, however, likely to 
influence human resource development objectives for disadvantaged workers. 
3)  As a labor economist primarily concerned with public policy, my approach 
will be to outline measures that might advance the public welfare by addressing the 
legitimate concerns of different parties without yielding to the illegitimate. Even 
though I have done very little work on the ILFP issue, I have done extensive work on 
labor markets—both as an academic researcher and as a designer and administrator of 
interventions to address particular problems. The approach that I have found useful in 
such work is to examine an issue from a variety of perspectives—theoretical, 
historical, quantitative and behavioral. Policy work also tends to be interdisciplinary. 
I do not think, for example, that we can or should separate purely economic analyses 
from criminal justice considerations since crime, incarceration and recidivism are 
serious economic, criminal justice, and human development problems. A good 
orienting hypothesis is that the present criminal justice and corrections system in the 
United States is not very efficient and does too little to rehabilitate offenders and 
prevent crime. The system apparently has interrelated, self-perpetuating components 
which make it difficult to change. It also seems that the American system is very 
different from its counterparts in other countries.   (Indeed, this subject could benefit 1
greatly from comparative adaptive learning.)  We therefore should attempt to develop 
policies that will help transform the criminal justice system and make it more 
effectively deter crime, rehabilitate and punish criminals, and reintegrate ex-offenders 
into society. Such policies would greatly reduce the enormous and growing human 
and economic costs of crime and incarceration. 
4)  As noted below, I do not have sufficient evidence to make adequate policy 
recommendations. My analyses, conclusions and recommendations are therefore 
based on very preliminary assessments of the evidence and designed more to 
stimulate discussion than to be serious policy proposals. 





I will first give more complete answers to the first two questions and then devote 
most of my remarks to the last two. I start with a brief historical overview and then 
proceed to an analysis of some limited evidence on the pros and cons of expanding 
the industrial (i.e., non-institutional) employment of inmates. The evidence, 
preliminary as it is, suggests that an expansion of ILFP could be in the legitimate 
interests of all the parties and therefore in the public interest. My main caveat is that 
expansion should be done through a constellation of policies to transform the present 
criminal justice system while improving the conditions of all of the parties, except 
perhaps the illegitimate interests of those who benefit from present arrangements. 
The first question is whether bans on ILFP are good or bad for the economy. As 
noted, the short answer to that question is that the bans on inmate labor have very little 
impact on GDP because prison industry output ($1.6 billion in 1997) is a very small 
fraction of the GDP (over $8 trillion). Moreover, the total prison labor force (611,000 in 
1997)  is small relative to the civilian labor force of 136 million. 2
Critics of ILFP are concerned less about the absolute numbers of prison inmates 
working than they are the trends and the impacts on particular industries, places and 
groups. The number of federal prison inmates has increased from 66,000 in 1990 to 
113,000 in 1997; the number of state inmates increased from 708,000 to 1,132,000 during 
those years.   There have been similar increases in the size of the inmate work force, 3
though non-institutional work opportunities have not kept pace with rising inmate 
populations, so industrial work forces constitute a smaller percentage of the prison 
populations than they did ten years ago. At the federal level, where a larger proportion of 
inmates are employed, 33 percent of inmates were employed in 1988 but only 18 percent 
were employed in 1996.  4
In addition to the trends, critics of ILFP are concerned that prisoners will be 
exploited and that low paid inmates will undercut free labor wages and working 
conditions. If they are paid at all, inmate workers generally earn less than $1 per hour. 
The range in the five-step federal industrial pay scale is from $0.23 to $1.15 per hour.  5
Unions have long been concerned about the negative impact of convict labor on free 
workers’ wages and working conditions, as well as the adverse affects of prison labor on 
workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively. It therefore is not surprising that the 
prohibitions on the employment of convicts in competition with free workers coincided 
with the growth of unions in the nineteenth century and during the 1930s. Before these 
2 Of these, 498,000 were involved in support work in their institutions, 75,000 were assigned to traditional 
prison industries producing goods and services mainly for state and federal agencies, and only 2,429 were 
employed in state and local prisons by private firms producing goods and services for open markets (Rod 
Miller, Mary Shillon, and Tom Petersik, “Inmate Labor in America's Correctional Facilities,” Discussion 
Draft, Preliminary report to the ABA’s Subcommittee on Correctional Industries, April 1998.) 
3 ​Prisoners in 1997​, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, August 1998. 
4 Hearings, House Subcommittee on Crime, September 18, 1996. 
5 In 1991 prison workers in non-industrial activities earned between $0.12 and $0.40 per hour; most (55%) 
earn $0.12 while 5% earn $0.40. (“Implications of the FLSA for Inmates, Corrections Institutions, Private 
Industry and Labor,” Statement of Lynn H. Gibson before the U.S. Senate Hearings of the Committee on 





restrictions were imposed, it was not uncommon for convicts to be used to break strikes. 
Indeed, unions still complain about the use of inmate labor to weaken strikes, prevent 
unionization, and undercut wages. 
In order to understand the nature and probable impact of relaxing the restrictions 
on the industrial employment of inmates, it is useful to review the history of convict 
labor, examine the circumstances that caused these restrictions, and to analyze some 
experiences with the employment of prison labor. It also is helpful to examine the 
arguments advanced by various interested actors. Such an examination reveals the nature 
of the evidence (as well as the political alignments) for and against relaxing the 
restrictions on the employment of inmates. 
 
Historical Overview 
Early in American history, prisoners were assigned to hard work of various kinds, 
which was considered necessary to punish inmates for their crimes and to purge them of 
the evils that led to their criminality. In addition, work always has been considered an 
effective way to control prisoners.  
In order to reduce the public costs of incarceration, various methods evolved to 
employ convicts in the production of goods and services to be sold in the public or 
private sectors. The first of these was ​the public-account system​ whereby governments 
sold the products of prison labor on the open market. The second was the ​state-use 
system​, which prevails today, where inmates produce goods and services to be sold to or 
used by government agencies. The third was the ​contract system​, making a comeback 
since federal enabling legislation in 1979, where the state sells prison labor to private 
firms. And the fourth was the ​lease system​ which vests in private companies the 
responsibility for the custody, care, discipline, and employment of inmates.​ Before the 
1930s, t​he contract system predominated in the North and the lease system in the South.  6
During the nineteenth century, reformers, businesses and unions successfully 
restricted the contract labor system. Union opposition moderated when contract bidding 
caused wage differentials between convicts and free workers to converge, but intensified 
when these differentials widened. Unions also naturally opposed the use of convicts as 
strikebreakers.  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, campaigns against contract labor 
were particularly vigorous in states like New York where unions were strong. Unions 
became stronger throughout the United States after national and federal labor 
organizations were created in the last half of the nineteenth century.  Unions gained wider 
public support for their campaigns against contract labor during the recessions of  the 
1870s and 1890s. The compromise worked out to settle the differences between the 
proponents and opponents of the commercialization of prison labor was the state-use 
system. 
The convict lease system was eliminated gradually in the South by the 1930s, 
mainly because it had become uneconomical but also because of public outcries 
following well-publicized exposes of appalling working conditions and often corrupt 
relationships between prison businesses, politicians, prosecutors and courts. The system 





became unprofitable when employers bid up convict costs to approximate those of free 
workers.  ​As in the North, Southern states replaced the lease system with state-use 7
policies, thus shifting the control and employment of convict labor from the private to the 
public sector.  In the North, convicts worked behind walls in the state-use system, while 
in the South chain gangs and state farms predominated. However, by the 1940s, well 
publicized abuses and the increase in the proportion of white prisoners, especially during 
the Great Depression, caused chain gangs to virtually disappear, although they are 
making a comeback in some places.  8
 
Federal Policies 
During and after the Great Depression the federal government adopted a number 
of measures to curtail the use of inmate labor in competition with free workers. The 
Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 subjected  the interstate shipment of prison-made goods to 
the restrictions on their sale in intrastate commerce previously imposed by many states. 
The 1935 Ashurst-Sumners Act added federal enforcement to Hawes-Cooper and made it 
a federal crime to knowingly export prison-made goods into a state that prohibited the 
sale of such goods. In 1940, Congress amended Ashurst-Sumners to make it a federal 
crime to transport and sell prison-made goods regardless of the provisions of state law. 
These laws greatly restricted the industrial employment of inmates. Garvey reports that 
“In 1885, 90% of the prison population worked. In 1997, the figure was only 6.2%.”  9
The failure of the state use system to provide more meaningful industrial employment to 
inmates is attributed to a number of factors, including mediocre management, poor 
legislative oversight, and the failure of state agencies to honor requirements that state 
agencies purchase prison-made goods. However, all of these problems appear to be 
related to the absence of effective competition for prison industries. 
At the federal level prison labor is organized by Federal Prison Industries, Inc. 
(FPI—often referred to by its trade name, UNICOR), a nonprofit corporation created in 
1934. In 1997 FPI operated 97 different factories in 46 locations but employed less than 
20 percent of the federal prison population. FPI produces products to be sold exclusively 
to federal agencies. In 1996, 38 percent of FPI’s sales were in the furniture industry and 
22 percent were in textiles and apparel.  Despite a requirement that federal agencies give 10
preference to UNICOR products, FPI accounts for less than 2 percent of federal 
procurement.  
In 1979 Congress passed the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Act which 
allows certified private companies to employ state and local  prison labor and to sell 
prison-made goods in interstate commerce, an action that some observers thought might 
restore the contract system. To be certified, a company must pay prevailing wages, 
demonstrate that inmates will not displace free workers, consult with unions, and make 
deductions from inmates’ compensation (not to exceed 80% of gross wages) for room 
7 Ibid., p. 364. 
8 Ibid., p. 366. 
9 Ibid., p. 370. 





and board, taxes, family support and contributions to victim compensation funds. 
Between the end of 1979 and June 15, 1995, about 1,600 PIE inmates had gross earnings 
of over $44 million, $23.6 million of which was deducted for victims’ programs ($3.6 
million), costs of incarceration ($10.5 million), family support ($3.4 million), and taxes 
($6.1 million). 
The 1994 Crime Bill largely deregulated prison industry and freed inmate labor 
from most federal restrictions, thus opening the sale of prison products to any private 
market. However, according to one prison labor expert, PIE’s growth is restricted by the 
prevailing wage requirement, which does not permit companies to compensate for the 
additional costs of doing business in prisons (e.g., additional security costs); he concludes 
that “Few industries will find it worthwhile to set up shop behind prison walls if they are 
forced to pay inmates the prevailing wage—unless, of course, the state offers a subsidy to 
offset these higher costs.”  11
 
Arguments For and Against Removing the Restrictions on Inmate Labor 
PIE and FPI supporters argue that these programs’ safeguards prevent them from 
undercutting free labor wages and working conditions or from unfairly competing with 
private sector companies.  Critics, on the other hand, argue that UNICOR routinely 12
violates PIE’s prevailing wage and business protection requirements, rendering those 
safeguards largely ineffective.   Business representatives argue, in addition, that FPI’s 13
mandatory sourcing requirement gives UNICOR an unfair competitive advantage. 
 
Unions:  At the present time unions believe that inmates should work, but generally 
oppose the expansion of the sale of convict-made products in competition with private 
industry or the employment of convicts in competition with free workers. 
The AFL-CIO has protested inmate working conditions as well as the threat 
expanded ILFP would pose to free workers. In 1997, for example, the federation’s 
Executive Council adopted a resolution protesting “the widespread use of prison labor in 
the U.S. in unfair competition with free labor and…ask[ed] that a complaint be filed with 
the International Labor Organization charging that the U.S. has violated ILO convention 
No. 105, which prohibits the use of forced or prison labor for economic development.”  14
Consistent with Samuel Gompers’ declaration that organized labor wanted “more 
constant work and less crime, more justice and less revenge,” national and state 
AFL-CIO affiliates encourage “the training of prisoners both to help in their 
rehabilitation and to reduce recidivism after their release. But, always with this caveat: 
11 Ibid., p. 373. 
12 See Robert Grieser , “Do Correctional Industries Adversely Impact the Private Sector?” ​Federal 
Probation​, March 1989, pp. 18-24. 
13 See House hearing, op cit. and Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, October 28, 1993.  





Prison labor never should be used to compete with free labor nor to replace it.”  An 15
AFL-CIO background paper specifically endorsed training programs like the South 
Central Iowa AFL-CIO’s apprenticeship partnership with the Iowa Department of 
Correction Prison Industries Division (discussed below), but noted that most prison 
training did not adequately prepare inmates for skilled work, partly because of an 
overemphasis on work at the expense of training. Union leaders have protested the use of 
prison labor to displace public as well as private employees and note that “From Alabama 
to New York, the old-fashioned chain or work gang is making a comeback.”  In addition, 16
the AFL-CIO contends that “Prison security has been compromised to accommodate the 
shipping needs of private operators.”   Texas AFL-CIO president Joe Gunn alleges that 17
“one high tech firm, American Microelectronics…closed its Austin facilities and laid off 
150 employees to move its operation behind bars” in a private prison at Lockhart, Texas 
where “convicts end up with about 84 cents an hour for their work.”  18
The AFL-CIO charged that PRIDE, a non-profit consortium of private companies 
in Florida (discussed below) “has the sole contract with Florida corrections for all work 
performed by prisoners in the state.  In 1996…Inmates received from 15-50 cents an hour 
for their work, with no minimum wage protection and no workers’ compensation.” 
John Zalusky of the AFL-CIO’s economic research department told the U.S. 
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee that it was “wrong for state-owned 
prisons to create or support businesses paying convicts substandard wages to take jobs 
from free labor who have committed no crime…”  The AFL-CIO agreed that inmates 
“should be working and should not be idle, and that the work they do should impart 
values that are useful to the free world. However, we believe that working at exploitive 
wages sends exactly the wrong message and bestows the wrong values. It says that hard 
work is unrewarding and that Government is an oppressor.”   Finally, “The AFL-CIO 19
supports the self-use concept of prison labor with effective business and labor input in the 
decision process to ensure minimal adverse impact on free labor.”  20
Of course, neither employers or unions take a uniform approach to the expansion 
of prison industries. Most unions oppose the sale of prison-made goods in open markets 
and the use of convict labor in competition with free workers. However, unions are more 
concerned about the wages and conditions of convict labor than they are about the fact 
that convicts are required to work, which they generally support. Moreover, unionized 
prison guards favor work by prison inmates because of its demonstrated effectiveness in 
improving prison safety, behavior and morale. Overcrowded prisons where inmates have 
nothing but idleness and boredom to occupy their time create dangerous and explosive 
situations for guards and inmates alike. 
15 AFL-CIO Public Employee Department, ​Prison Labor: Are We Heading Back to the Future?” ​February 
1997, p. 1. 
16 Ibid., p. 7. 
17 Ibis., p. 8. 
18 Ibid., p. 9. 
19 Senate hearing, op cit., p. 31. 






Businesses:  ​While business organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce oppose the 
expansion of the sale of prison-made goods in open markets, some companies favor 
present arrangements because they profit from the use of inmate labor or sell supplies and 
materials to prison industries.  
Industry critics of the FPI program argue that UNICOR’s failure to honor the 
program’s safeguards against unfair competition damages private businesses. Moreover, 
these critics argue, the mandatory sourcing requirement causes UNICOR to be a 
monopoly which produces poor quality products and service at inflated prices. For 
example, Michael Gale, Director of Government Relations for the Apparel Manufacturers 
Association alleged: 
UNICOR steals jobs from…hardworking law-abiding, tax-paying citizens…We estimate 
that over the years, 7,000 private sector apparel workers have lost their jobs because of 
UNICOR’s continued and unchecked expansion of apparel manufacturing…The 
[Defense Personnel Supply Command (DPSC)] estimates that it pays, on average, 15% 
more than the lowest private sector bid on almost 100% of what it buys from 
UNICOR…[I]n fiscal year 1995, UNICOR was delinquent in 46% of its contracts with 
DPSC. In…1996 UNICOR was delinquent in 36% of its contracts. For both years the 
private sector was delinquent in only 9% of its contracts.”   21
Gale reported that a 1991 “Deloitte and Touche study indicates that UNICOR receives 
poor quality ratings from its customers​.”   22
There are similar complaints about state prison industry products. According to a 
1994 ​Forbes​ article on the California Prison Industry Authority (PIA),  
state agencies are required to give [PIA] first crack at supplying goods, regardless of 
price or quality… 
A private furniture manufacturer offered to deliver…chairs [to California State 
Polytechnic University] within six weeks for $54 apiece. But Cal Poly was obliged to buy 
[PIA’s] chairs for $92 each. Eight months after the orders were placed, 54 of the 213 
chairs have yet to be delivered… 
“[PIA’s] cost is always higher [than private suppliers’],” fumes Jerry Schroeder, a Cal. 
Dept. of Motor Vehicles purchasing officer. “Not sometimes—always.”  23
Inmate Advocates:  ​Other critics allege that during the 1980s and ‘90s a combination of 
“get tough on criminals” policies and the expansion of industrial employment has led to 
the exploitation of inmates, who are powerless to protect themselves except through 
litigation, which is expensive, time consuming and uncertain. “Get tough” policies have 
contributed greatly to a prison population explosion, sharply increasing prison costs (a 
commonly cited figure is $20,000-$25,0000 annual cost per prisoner), thus exerting great 
pressure to expand ILFP as a way to offset part of the added cost. These developments 
also enable corrections institutions to charge prisoners for court costs, the compensation 
21 House hearing, op cit., pp. 102, 106. 
22 Ibid., p. 116. 





of victims, room and board, and medical care. These charges put great pressure on 
inmates to work but also limit their net compensation. As noted earlier, the AFL-CIO 
contends that the pressures to work limit the education and training needed for 
rehabilitation. 
Industrial work by prisoners is voluntary, but inmates allege that a refusal to work 
often leads to abuse by prison officials. Moreover, all able-bodied prisoners are required 
to work, but are compensated much better for industrial than for institutional 
employment. These conditions cause some, especially the AFL-CIO, to believe that the 
United States is vulnerable to the charge that our prison labor polices are in violation of 
ILO Convention 105 on forced labor.  24
 
Arguments For and Against Relaxing Restrictions 
Those who favor relaxing the restrictions on the employment of inmates make a 
number of arguments: 
1)  The expansion of paid employment would benefit inmates, their families, their 
victims, corrections institutions and the general public​. 
2)  Under present arrangements, inmates and their families suffer because they are 
locked into self-perpetuating cycles of poverty and crime. According to one assessment, 
“…there are seven million children with a parent in jail or prison or recently released on 
probation or parole.”  Having a parent behind bars, according to this report, puts children 25
in much greater risk of a life of delinquency and crime. Indeed, this link is so strong that 
half of all juveniles in custody have a parent or close relative who has been in jail or 
prison. And 40 percent of the 1.8 million adult inmates have a parent or sibling behind 
bars​.  ​Expanding paid employment, proponents argue, would provide marketable skills 26
for inmates, income for them and their families, reduce recidivism and thus do much to 
break these self-generating and intergenerational cycles of poverty. 
Perhaps the best evidence on the relationship between prison industries work and 
recidivism is from the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Post-Release Employment Project 
(PREP), a seven-year research and evaluation study published in 1991 and updated in 
1996. This study compared inmates who worked in prison industries with those with 
similar backgrounds who did not participate in FPI work or receive vocational training. 
This study found that relative to releasees who were not involved in prison industries 
while incarcerated, FPI inmates demonstrated better institutional adjustment while in 
prison, were less likely to recidivate, had higher earnings and were more likely to be 
employed. The 1996 update tracked the same inmates for up to 12 years after release 
24 See Daniel Burton-Rose, Dan Pens, and Paul Wright (eds.), ​The Celling of America​ (Monroe, ME: 
Common Courage Press, 1998); Christian Parenti, “Pay Now, Pay Later: States Impose Prison Peonage,” 
Progressive, ​July 1996; Idem, “Making Prison Pay: Business Funds the Cheapest Labor of All,” ​Nation​, 
January 29, 1996; Idem, “Inside Jobs,” ​New Statesman and Society​, November 3, 1995 
25 Fox Butterfield, “As Inmate Population Grows, So Does a Focus on Children,” ​New York Times​, April 7, 






“and concluded that FPI inmates had a 20% greater chance of obtaining employment, 
earning higher salaries upon release…and remaining crime free.”  27
In their 1997 study of PREP enrollees, William Saylor and Gerald Gaes found 
that participants had a recidivism rate of 6.6% compared with an overall federal inmate 
rate of 20% and 10.1% for a comparison group.  28
Less controlled evidence on the relationship between recidivism and state prison 
industries employment comes from the Enterprise Prison Institute (EPI), “a private 
research and education organization focused on the management of our prison and 
criminal justice systems.”  EPI summarized general data from a number of states, 29
including PRIDE, which compared 2,068 inmates who had worked for PRIDE for six 
months or more (between 1990 and 1994) before their release in 1995 with state prisoners 
who did not work for PRIDE. Two years after their release 11% of the PRIDE 
participants had returned to prison compared with 27% for non-PRIDE releasees. 
According to a 1998 PRIDE report, “of the 560 ex-offenders who had worked for 
PRIDE for six months or more in fiscal year 1995, seventy-one or 12.7% recommitted 
within a two-year period.”  This compared with a Florida inmate recidivism rate of 30
18.8% for FY 1994-95, the most recent year for which data are available. There has, 
however, been no attempt to compare PRIDE enrollees with similar non-enrollee 
inmates. Such a comparison would provide a better assessment of PRIDE’s impact. 
A somewhat more controlled study of Ohio Prison Industries (OPI) compared 744 
releasees in 1992 who had worked for OPI at least 90 days with 7,839 non-OPI releasees 
who met the basic requirements for participation in OPI. Overall, the OPI participants 
recidivated 18 percent less—24.6% compared with 29.9% for non-OPI inmates. The 
skilled OPI releasees had a recidivism rate of 15%, about half that of the control group. 
Blacks with OPI experience recidivated at 26.8 percent compared with 36.5% for 
non-OPI blacks, a much greater impact than the comparable rates for whites, which were 
22.3% and 23.1%.  31
3)  More paid work would enable prisoners to make restitution for their crimes. 
Once incarcerated, offenders have no way to make restitution or to support themselves or 
their families. As former Chief Justice Warren Burger put it: “To put people behind walls 
and bars and do little or nothing to change them is to win a battle but lose the war. It is 
wrong. It is expensive. It is stupid.”  32
4) More private sector work might do much to improve the culture of correction 
institutions by relieving the tensions created by boredom and idleness, instilling a work 
ethic in prisoners, and helping defray the high and rising costs of incarceration. 
27 Letter from Steve Schwab, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, to J. Michael Quinlan, May 12, 
1997. 
28 “Training Inmates,” ​Corrections Management Quarterly​ 1, no. 2, 1997, pp. 32-43. 
29 Statement of Knut A. Rostad, President of EPI, Hearing, Subcommittee on Crime, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, September 18, 1996, pp. 43-50. 
30 http://peol.com/Annual%20Report/1998Highlights.htm 
31 Ibid. 





Moreover, subjecting prison industries to the discipline of competitive markets might 
greatly improve the efficiency of prison industry and, depending on competitive 
strategies, the value of the training inmates receive. Market discipline might do much to 
change the prison culture, which many experts consider more to train inmates to be 
criminals than to rehabilitate them. According to this view, prison bureaucracies are 
self-perpetuating institutions concerned mainly with incarceration, not rehabilitation. It is 
conceivable that greater private employment, with proper safeguards, could cause prisons 
to be more concerned with better classifications and groupings of inmates.  There can be 
little doubt that removing mandatory sourcing requirements and subjecting prison 
industries to competition would cause them to become less complacent and more 
efficient.  
 
What Kinds of Policies Might Accomplish These Outcomes? 
 
Removing or offsetting unjustified competitive advantages and disadvantages 
between free market and prison industries also might facilitate expansion of industrial 
employment by reducing opposition to ILFP expansion. It is not clear what would be 
required to achieve this objective. For example, many, including Vice President Gore’s 
National Performance Review, recommend eliminating the mandatory sourcing 
requirement for FPI. By contrast, FPI officials argue that eliminating mandatory sourcing 
would destroy prison industries which, they argue, must have this requirement in order to 
attract private partners and offset the economic disadvantages they suffer because of 
prison security conditions and the low quality of prison labor. 
However, conceivably prison industries could compensate for these disadvantages 
by deductions from inmates’ earnings, as is done now, and by using public revenues for 
education, training and other services to inmates.  Because of the social returns to human 
capital formation, it is in the national interest to remove the financial barriers to education 
and training for all workers in and out of prison.  These human capital services might, in 
effect, be subsidies to prison industry, as well as investments in the rehabilitation of 
inmates. 
Competition also might be improved by requiring prison industries to observe the 
same labor standards—including the right to unionize—as their private sector 
competitors. 
Some insight into the efficacy of procedures to balance compensation between 
inmates and free workers might be found in the U.S. experience with adverse effect wage 
rates (AEWR) for temporary foreign workers and prevailing wages for government 
contractors. The basic purpose of the AEWR is to prevent the employment of foreign 
workers from depressing domestic working conditions. Similarly, prevailing wage laws 
are supposed to prevent governments from using their economic power to depress labor 
standards. The application of prevailing and minimum wage requirements to prison 
industry could require these industries to compete by becoming more efficient rather than 
through lower labor standards.  Some argue that prison industries cannot compete if they 
have to pay prevailing wages (from which prison officials could make deductions), but 





while paying prevailing wages, though how much PIE companies evade this requirement 
is not clear. 
Another area that should be explored is the application of anti-discrimination 
policies and concepts to ex-offenders. These policies, like other labor standards, are 
justified as needed to cause labor market decisions to be based on productivity and merit 
instead of race, gender, age or other factors. This is a complex, controversial and 
important subject which would require careful study and debate, but we have a wealth of 
experience with anti-discrimination policies in other areas. To be useful for policy, a 
theory of discrimination should define discrimination and assess its impact on various 
actors, as well as explain why it occurs and how it changes.  There can be little doubt 33
that ex-offenders have employment problems related to a combination of discrimination 
and legitimate labor market factors, which would have to be sorted out. An effective 
rehabilitation program would include measures to overcome human capital (education, 
training, health and motivation) disadvantages. It could be that anti-discrimination 
measures would cause human capital programs to be more effective. 
Lessons from anti-discrimination policies in other areas that might be useful in 
developing such policies for ex-offenders include: 
1) A careful understanding of the nature, meaning and relative importance of economic 
discrimination (ED). Some basic principles are applicable in all cases: 
a) ED is caused by a combination of status and economic advantage for the 
discriminators; status, because people discriminated against have identifiable 
characteristics which cause victims to be considered inferior by discriminators.. 
b) ED varies in intensity between different groups of victims. 
c) ED is difficult to identify and measure because it is part of a complex 
constellation of factors that cause victims to be disadvantaged. 
d) It is important to distinguish institutionalized forms of discrimination from 
specific overt acts that can be proved in courts or administrative processes. 
Different policies are required to counteract institutional and overt ED. 
e) Discrimination is an action while prejudice is an attitude, which may or may not 
lead to discrimination depending upon the power relationships between actors. 
Through cognitive dissonance in economic relationships, attitudes are more likely 
to flow from actions than actions are from attitudes. 
There seems to be little doubt that some ED stems from misperceptions about the 
corrigibility of ex-offenders. These misperceptions might be overcome by better 
classifications of inmates based on profiles of the degrees of risk, public information 
campaigns and demonstrations of successful rehabilitation. Anti-discrimination 
demonstrations might start with private prison industry and government contractors, as 
was the case with race, gender and other forms of ED. There is little doubt in my mind 
that discrimination against ex-offenders is a barrier to their rehabilitation and 
reintegration into society or that the elimination of such discrimination would be in the 
33 Ray Marshall, “The Economics of Racial Discrimination: A Survey,” ​Journal of Economic Literature​ 12, 
No. 3, September 1974; Ray Marshall, “Civil Rights and Social Equity: Beyond Neoclassical Theory,” in 
New Directions in Civil Rights Studies​, Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan (eds.) (Charlottesville, 





public interest. But I would need more information than I have to assess the importance 
of discrimination relative to human capital factors and to specify how an ex-offender 
anti-discrimination policy might work. The clearest and least controversial case would be 
to outlaw discrimination by private prison industries and government contractors. Some 
incentives (competitive advantage) might be given to non-discriminatory employers. 
The unionization of inmates might have several advantages. For one thing, an 
effective alternative dispute resolution process could reduce the cost of litigation by 
inmates, which some consider mainly trivial and very expensive for the states.   Unions 34
also could become advocates for inmates within the prisons and perhaps accelerate prison 
reform. There is little doubt that prisoners need effective alternatives to the courts, which 
are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. Unions also could strengthen the 
enforcement of existing laws, supplementing the limited enforcement resources available 
to federal agencies. My limited investigations for this paper found numerous allegations 
of evasion of labor and private industry protections by prison industries.  
Unions could, in addition, help with the rehabilitation process by providing skill 
development, especially through apprenticeship training, which would improve inmate 
earnings while in prison and after their release. Prototype programs have been created in 
Iowa and other places. Training in registered apprentice programs provide geographic 
and occupational mobility, as well as higher wages and the efficient acquisition of skills. 
A system that permitted private industry to bid for the right to operate prison 
industries could increase efficiency and provide more paid jobs for inmates. Special 
attention might be given to targeting industries most likely to migrate out of the United 
States. An independent board representative of all stakeholders could accept bids from a 
variety of organizations, including those that already operate prison industries. The bid 
notices could specify the conditions necessary to protect and promote the interests of 
inmates, businesses, prison functions and the public.  Along with the usual business 
qualifications, bid specifications should include labor standards, security requirements 
and other matters to facilitate inmate rehabilitation. For example, because education and 
training are so important to rehabilitation, special preference might be given to 
companies that provide effective training and post-release placement and support services 
for inmates. A prototype for at least some components of this activity could be the 
PRIDE Enterprises, a nonprofit conglomerate of private sector businesses created by the 
Florida legislature in 1981 to reduce the cost of state government and to achieve 
rehabilitative goals by “duplicating as  nearly as possible the operating activities of a 
free-enterprise type of profit-making enterprise.” In FY 1998 PRIDE’s sales were $81.2 
million and it employed 4,890 inmates for 4,321,548 hours.  PRIDE also provides 35
structured on-the-job training and education benefits, as well as post-release job 
placement, education assistance and support (over half of PRIDE’s inmate workers are 
placed “directly to the community and available for work”).​   36
34 See statement by Senator Harry Reid, FLSA Hearing, p. 2.  According to Sen. Reid, 40% of civil 
litigation in Nevada federal courts is by prisoners (p. 4). 
35 http://peol.com/annual%20Report/1998Highlights.httm. 






A more detailed formal evaluation might show whether or not PRIDE is a suitable 
model for replication. While PRIDE apparently has some strong features, it is not clear 
that workers’ interests are adequately protected, as suggested by the AFL-CIO’s 
complaints noted earlier. It is equally questionable that a state-created monopoly is the 
most effective way to manage prison industries.  With appropriate safeguards, a more 
competitive model might greatly improve education, training and inmate rehabilitation. 
Such a system also might provide greater incentives for inmates to improve their job 
skills and earnings. 
2) More balanced competition is necessary but not sufficient to make significant 
improvements in prisons and the development of opportunities for inmates and their 
families. Rewards for the acquisition of work skills and knowledge as well as work 
performance could be a valuable component of a more effective rehabilitation system. 
Although there are unlikely to be enough industrial jobs for all inmates, an expanded 
work program could facilitate better classification and separation of workers (in terms of 
their probability for successful rehabilitation) from those who need closer supervision. 
Grouping inmates might create better peer pressure for successful work careers rather 
than for criminal activities. 
A careful analysis of recidivism in Texas and elsewhere demonstrates that “since 
recidivism is caused by a complex constellation of factors it is unlikely that any single 
factor intervention strategy would be successful.”  While employment is necessary for 37
the successful reintegration of ex-offenders, it is not sufficient; other factors include 
counseling, education and training, drug treatment, and post-release support and 
placement services. Since an estimated three-fourths of inmates are considered to be 
functionally illiterate,  education is a much better way to occupy inmates’ time than the 38
make work and idleness that is characteristic of many prisons.   The labor standards for 39
prison industries, including institutional occupations performed by inmates, could 
therefore ensure a proper balance between work, education, and rehabilitative counseling. 
There is strong evidence that marginal low-wage work alone will not do much to 
improve the earnings of inmates or anyone else.  Real improvements depend on the 40
acquisition of a strong work ethic and marketable skills. The best skill development 
programs are those like registered apprenticeships that combine the simultaneous 
development of standards-based knowledge with manual skills. Such a program for 
inmates has been developed by the Iowa Department of Corrections Prison Industries 
Division and the South Central Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO’s Labor Institute for 
Economic Development. This is a registered apprenticeship program in established prison 
37 Susan Marshall, “Reintegration of Ex-Offenders: The Role of Employment and Other Factors,” Ph.D. 
dissertation, Brandeis University, 1992, p. i. 
38 See statement from the National Governors’ Association, “A National Strategy on the Prison Crowding 
Problem,” HR-16, n.d. 
39 See T.J. Flanagan and K. Maguire, “A Full Employment Policy for Prisons in the U.S.: Some Arguments, 
Estimates and Implications,” ​Journal of Criminal Justice​ 21, pp. 117-130, 1993. 
40 See Garth Mangum, “A Thirty-Five Year Perspective on Workforce Development Programs,” in Ray 
Marshall (ed.), Back to Shared Prosperity: The Growing Inequality of Wealth and Income in America 





industries in three of Iowa’s correctional facilities. The first three programs were in 
machine tooling, printing and graphic design. The union takes responsibility for placing 
successful graduates through its hiring hall. According to South Central Iowa’s AFL-CIO 
president, “It’s our duty and our job to represent [prison inmate apprentices] in the job 
market.”  Debate on the issue at union meetings transformed rejection of ex-offenders to 41
acceptance of fellow union members who have successfully served apprenticeships 
highly valued by union members. 
A number of states have developed what appear to be effective job training 
programs for inmates. In 1993, for example, Oklahoma had 570 inmates enrolled in skill 
training classes. The Oklahoma program is different from those of most states in that it is 
operated by the Oklahoma Department of Vocational and Technical Education instead of 
the Department of Corrections. All instructors and administrators are employed by the 
state vo-tech department. It would be interesting to examine Oklahoma’s experiences in 
depth to determine whether or not a non-corrections education and training staff could be 
more effective, or how much it might affect the traditional prison culture. According to a 
1993 report, the Oklahoma program, initiated by a state senator in 1970, had been 
beneficial to both the corrections and vo-tech departments. The most significant benefit 
of this arrangement was to ensure the “program’s focus on education. Programs operated 
by corrections officials often tend to be measured in terms of their ability to address 
idleness, security issues and the institutions’ maintenance needs.”  The Oklahoma 42
arrangement also has greatly enhanced student-teacher bonding and provides inmates 
access to state-of-the-art equipment that legislators often are unwilling to provide to 
corrections institutions. Their commitment to their program was sufficiently strong that 
student inmates protected the training facility during a riot in one of Oklahoma’s prisons.  
Students who enroll in the program receive an occupational plan for training in a 
variety of trades and occupations lasting from 18 to 32 weeks. Job placement is a major 
problem in the reintegration of ex-offenders into society. Oklahoma finds placement to be 
a challenge, but provides job placement specialists to help inmates who complete the 
program. It was reported in 1993 that 70 percent of all minimum security graduates are 
placed within 90 days of their release. Reviews in Maryland, Oklahoma and Illinois have 
found that inmates’ performance in vo-tech programs is comparable to that of similar 
non-inmate students and that inmates who complete these programs recidivate at lower 
rates than other students.  In 1999, Oklahoma’s vo-tech department operated three 43
registered apprenticeship programs (meat processing, welding and food services). In 
April 1999, the department’s acting director told me that they had no trouble placing 
certified apprentice graduate releasees. 
 
41 Rostad, op cit., p. 50. 
42 Tom Freedman, “Corrections/Vo-Tech Partnership Offers Maximum Training Benefits,” ​Corrections 







With this background, I can provide tentative answers to the questions posed for 
this project: 
1. I believe the recommendations I have made could permit the expansion of ILFP 
to be good for most stakeholders. The main losers would be those companies that cannot, 
or do not wish to, compete on a level playing field. It remains to be seen, of course, 
whether private companies will be willing to hire inmates under the conditions I propose. 
However, I believe it possible to adjust prison programs and the inmate wage deduction 
system to make prison labor attractive to good employers, especially if employers, along 
with unions and other stakeholders, are involved in negotiating the actual terms of 
employment. And provided further that tight labor markets and the targeting of 
appropriate prison industries create incentives for companies to use inmate labor while 
protecting low wage workers in the private sector from surges in supplies of prison-made 
products. Inmates, their families and victims, and prison systems would all benefit from 
expanded paid employment. Unions could be major beneficiaries if they are given a 
larger role and are able to make themselves attractive to inmate workers. An expansion of 
employment is unlikely to be large enough to offset the high cost of incarceration, but it 
could greatly improve rehabilitation and free up resources for other prison activities. The 
reduced recidivism rate might moderate the rise in prison populations, but alternatives to 
incarceration for non-violent offenders also could relieve the pressures on prisons. Above 
all, these changes might make better use of prisoners’ time for work, education, and 
training than the debilitating and dangerous idleness which seems to be the norm now. 
2. I believe the key steps in improving the economic contribution of the inmate 
labor force are: expand paid employment within the framework of balanced 
competition and protective labor standards, strengthen employment and 
training, and  promote the more effective reintegration of ex-offenders into the 
work force. In order to sell these recommendations to the public and to policy 
makers, we need to collect better evidence about what works and why in each 
of these processes. This could be done by more detailed research, followed by 




In addition to his presentation, Ray Marshall also provided comment to panelists, extending the 
detail of his views on inmate labor force participation.  A fuller sense of his views includes 
understanding both the remarks and questions of the panelists and his responses to panelists.  His 
full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues can be found 
below in the chapter presenting the panel: 
 
 Panelist Response Subjects 
 
Harry Holzer Minimum Wages and Wage Setting 
Labor Union and Labor Representation 
 





Role of Mediation 
 
Wendell Primus Role of Measurement and Rewards 
International Labor Standards for Voluntary Labor 
 
Steve Schwalb Effects on Prison Culture 
Choosing Appropriate Prison Industries 
 
Brenda Smith Understanding Employment Effects on Female Inmates 
 
Charles Sullivan Education and Skill Development (Two part response, including to 
moderator’s follow-up question) 
Computers and Technology Skills Building 
 
Greg Woodhead Unionization 










The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation 
 
May 21, 1999 
The George Washington University 




Presentation by Richard Freeman 
Making the Most From Inmate Labor 
Biography 
 
Professor Richard B. Freeman holds the Ascherman Chair of Economics at Harvard University. 
He is currently serving as Faculty Co-chair of the Harvard University Trade Union Program. 
Professor Freeman is Program Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Program 
in Labor Studies.  He is also Co-director of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London 
School of Economics and Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. 
 
Professor Freeman is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  He has served 
on five panels of the National Academy of  Science: high-risk youth; post secondary education 
and training in the workplace; employment and technical change; demographic and economic 
impacts of immigration; and national needs for biomedical and behavioral sciences. 
 
Professor Freeman received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1969.  Before returning to 
Harvard in 1975, he taught at the University of Chicago and Yale University. 
 
Professor Freeman has published over 250 articles dealing with topics in youth labor market 
problems, crime, higher education, trade unionism, transitional economies, high skilled labor 
markets, economic discrimination, social mobility, income distribution, and equity in the 
marketplace.  In addition, he has written or edited 21 books, several of which have been 
translated into French, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese.  Some of his recent books include ​Labor 
Market Institutions and Economic Success  ​(1999), ​What Workers Want? ​(1999), ​Generating 
Jobs: How to Increase Demand for Less-Skilled Workers ​(1998), and ​Differences and Changes 






Many prisoners work within prisons producing goods and services to maintain 
correctional facilities, reducing the costs to taxpayers of maintaining prisoners and gaining some 
work skills. A much smaller number work in traditional correctional industry activities, such as 
for the Federal Prisons.  The ABA Subcommittee on Correctional Industries estimated that total 
employment of prisoners in 1997 in traditional correctional industries amounted to about 75,000 
in a workforce of over 136 million persons, while just 2,400 prisoners worked for private sector 
industries (ABA, figure 3).  Federal Prison Industries, UNICOR, employs about 17,000 inmates. 
With nearly 2 million inmates in 1999 the majority of whom are in state and federal prisons 
where inmate work could be most readily increased, there is considerable potential scope for 
increasing the work activity of prisoners.  
 
What are the likely economic consequences of an  increase in  the amount of  work 
prisoners do for the market outside of prisons?  Who would benefit?  Who would lose?  What 
would be the most efficacious way to increase the work activity of prisoners? 
 
This short comment seeks to answer these questions.  The main theme is that the effects 
of increased prisoner work activity on the economy depends on three critical economic 
parameters:  
 
the impact of prison labor on the wages/employment of competing labor;  
the effect of wages and employment on the criminal behavior of competing labor 
the effect of prison labor in reducing recidivism by prisoners. 
 
The starting point for this analysis is the simple economic principle that if prison labor 
produces goods that reduce the wages/employment of competing labor, those outside workers 
suffer an economic loss.  If this loss is small and those workers can find roughly comparable jobs 
elsewhere, prison labor will increase national output.  If, in addition, prison labor reduces 
recidivism (or in some other way lowers crime) the economy will also benefit by being able to 
shift resources to more productive activities.  To the extent that prison labor makes prisons more 
easy to manage, moreover, this will reduce the cost to taxpayers, and increase output.  This is an 
Ideal Prison Labor scenario.  
 
But if increased prison work reduces substantially the economic well-being of 
comparable non-prison labor if the workers competing with prisoners respond to lower wages/ 
employment losses by engaging in crime, prison labor will reduce output.  This is a Horror 
Prison Labor situation. 
 
My calculations suggest that on net national output would increase if we increase prison 
labor, but the range of estimates for the critical demand and supply parameters is sufficiently 
wide to suggest that we cannot rule out either the Ideal Prison Labor or Horror Prison Labor 
situations.   Hence, I stress that we consider ways to structure the use of prison labor to produce 
goods that bring the least harm to competing free labor and most reduce recidivism: that prison 
labor produce import-competing commodities and employ prisoners with the greatest potential 
for productive non-criminal careers outside of prison. 
 
Underlying my analysis are two basic facts.  First, that most prisoners are unskilled and 
can make only a modest productive contribution to national output, so that their impact on the 
national economy will be rather slight.  Second, that crime and the criminal justice system are 
sufficiently costly to society that effects of prison labor on crime must be a significant 
component in any assessment of the economics of prison labor. 
  
Prison labor as trade/immigration 
 
I treat the effect of prison labor on the domestic economy from the perspective of the 
economics of trade or immigration.   In trade/immigration analysis an increase in imports due to 
freer trade or increased competence of foreign labor or of immigrants from overseas raises 
national output ​and​ lowers the earnings of competing domestic factors.  From the perspective of 
the free labor market, an increase in the work of prisoners is equivalent to an increase in 
imports/immigration from some foreign country.  
 
As a starting point, consider the effect of prison labor on the earnings/employment of 
similarly skilled labor in the competitive market.   Let S = A + e W be the supply curve of 
workers of inmate quality, where S is the (log) supply, W is (log) wages. .  Let D= B-​η​W be the 
demand curve for those workers, where D is the log of demand.  The market clearing wage and 
employment are W = (B-A)/(e + ​η​) and E = (eB + ​η​A)/(e+​η​). 
 
If an increase in the supply of inmates raises the supply of workers producing the relevant 
products by I percent (ln points), this will drive down the wage by I/(e+​η​).  Non-inmate 
employment will fall by (e)/(e+h)[I] while inmate and non-inmate employment will rise by 
η​/(e+​η​) I. In total, there will be ​η​I/(e+​η​) extra workers, who will increase national output. 
The benefit of prison inmate labor is the increase in output, which benefits all citizens.  The cost 
is the reduction in wages of competitors, which falls on a small number of close competitors.  
 
Analysts of immigration distinguish between the gains to immigrants and the gains to 
natives from increased immigration.  In the case of prisoners, the issue is more complicated, 
since the state can decide what proportion of prisoner marginal product goes to the prisoner, to 
recompensing victims, or to covering the expenses of incarceration.  
 
In any case, the more elastic is the demand for labor, the smaller will be the gains to the 
country and the smaller the economic losses to competing labor from increased prison work. 
The effect of the supply of competing labor on the analysis is more complicated.  The more 
elastic the supply of competing labor, the smaller will be the economic losses to them.  If their 
next best alternatives are legitimate ones, GDP will rise more, but if next best alternatives are 
illegitimate ones, a high supply elasticity will show up in a large increase in crime.  In this case 
the effect of prison labor on national output may be negative.  
 
The effects of inmate labor on crime 
 
 
The analysis of prison labor diverges from the analysis of immigration and trade because 
prison labor can affect criminal behavior, which has large costs on the society.  Indeed, because 
inmates are disproportionately less educated young men, with only modest productivity in 
legitimate work, the economic effects of prison labor through its effect on criminal behavior may 
dominate any benefit-cost assessment of prison labor. Some rough calculations make this clear. 
Estimates of the ratio of output from prison industries to the number of prison workers by the 
ABA show that prison labor is about 1/3rd as productive as the average member of the work 
force: gross sales per inmate are around $20,000 while gross sales per employee in the national 
economy are around $60,000 (ABA, figure 12).  
 
The marginal productivity/earnings of inmates is likely to be in the area of the minimum 
wage ​​ say, $10-5,000 per year.  The cost of incarceration is about $30,000 per year while the 
social cost of a criminal is likely to be at least $30,000 per year.  In addition, there are sizable 
costs to administering the non-corrections part of the criminal justice system.  These magnitudes 
suggest that whatever increase in GDP we get from additional prison labor ​could​ be offset (or 
worse) if it induced additional crime from the competing work force.  
 
But, by the same argument, the biggest potential benefit from prison labor will be in 
reducing recidivism and the costs of future crime. Assume that prison labor reduces recidivism 
by 20%.  Then for each year after the prisoner is released, society will gain .20 x 30,000 = 
$6,000.  Discounted at 10%, this gives a present value gain of some $60,000 (ignoring the finite 
life correction term in the discounting).  
 
How sizable is the likely effect of prison labor on the wages or employment of 
non-prison workers? 
 
There are no studies of this issue, so we have to rely on other information.  On the one 
side, minimum wage analyzes suggest that the elasticity of demand for low skill labor is rather 
small, -0.10 is a typical value found in some studies.  This would imply that an increase in prison 
labor would have a huge effect on the wages/employment of competing workers.  But on the 
other side, analyzes of the effect of immigrants on employment/wages of natives find small 
effects that imply a high elasticity of demand.  If this were the case, an increase in prison labor 
would have little effect on the wages/employment of competing workers.  There is no simple 
way to make these two differing estimates consistent. 
 
 How sizable is the supply responsiveness to crime of low skill workers, who would 
compete with prison labor? 
  
While there is a growing body of evidence that economic factors in the form of 
unemployment and wages paid low skill workers affect crime, there is no professional consensus 
about the elasticity of crime to wages (Freeman, 1999).  There are estimates as large as 1.0 but 
also estimates that suggest much smaller responsiveness.  Most studies find that unemployment 
increases crime, so if competing workers lost their jobs, there would likely be some increase in 
crime, irrespective of the wage effects. 
 
 
Given this imprecision, I shall simply take some ​​plausible​​ parameter values to 
illustrate the forces at work.   The reader can put in his or her own plausible values to see how 
the results might vary.  For my story, I assume that there are 1000 unskilled workers in the 
economy and 100 inmates (this is a reasonable proportion for high school dropout young men).  I 
further assume that the supply elasticity of unskilled labor is 1 and the demand elasticity is also 
1.  In this case the market model predicts that the 10% increase in total supply due to inmates 
working would reduce the employment of unskilled workers in the economy by 5%.  In 
equilibrium there will be 1050 workers in the sector, 100 inmates and 950 non-inmates.  National 
output in the sector would rise roughly by 50 x $15,000 or $750,000.  The wage of the 
competing workers would fall by 5%.  
 
The key is what happens to the 50 non-inmates who have left the affected sector.  If all of 
these workers engage in crime and none found other productive work, the cost to the country 
would be 50x $30,000 -- two times the gain!   If the cost of crime is higher than $30,000 the cost 
to the country is even larger.  But the assumption that all of the non-inmates who leave the 
affected sector engage in crime is extreme.  If a quarter of the 50 non-inmates no longer working 
entered crime and the others found some gainful work, national output would increase. 
 
How sizable is the reduction in recidivism due to prisoners working while incarcerated? 
 
Again, there is no firm widely accepted estimate, but at least one major study has found 
that prison labor does indeed reduce recidivism (Saylor and Gaes, 1995).  The reduction in 
recidivism is about the same as the reduction due to providing job training to prisoners ​​ about 
20 percent.   This implies that annually 20 of the 100 inmates would eschew crime for a gain of 
20 x $30,000 or $600,000 to the economy.  This gain is in the same ballpark as the estimated 




The preceding analysis directs attention at the following information, for us to assess the 
economics of prison labor: 
 
1) Elasticity of demand for the goods/labor with which prison-made goods compete 
 
2) The ​​next best​​ alternatives for workers who compete with prison labor, 
particularly the extent to which crime is an alternative, and thus the crime elasticity of low skill 
workers to the job market. 
 
3) The effect of prison labor on inmate recidivism 
 
 
My quantitative calculations suggest that the effects of prison labor through crime ​ 
increasing the crime among workers competing with prisoners or reducing recidivism among 
inmates ​​ are of comparable magnitude to the increased production from prison labor.  An ideally 
structured prison labor program thus would direct prison labor into areas that are as 
non-competitive with domestic production as possible ​​ towards producing goods that we 
currently import ​​ and would employ prisoners most likely to return to legitimate society and 
make use of the skills they learn from prison labor.  Finally, prison labor should be used more  in 
periods of economic boom, when the job/earnings opportunities for low skill workers are likely to 
be high, than in periods of national recession.  On net, I believe that the gains from reduced 
recidivism and the gains to output probably exceed the cost of the additional crime that prison 
production is likely to create.  But my assessment depends on the magnitudes of effects, so I could 
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In addition to his presentation, Richard Freeman also provided comment to panelists, extending the 
detail of his views on inmate labor force participation.  A fuller sense of his views includes 
understanding both the remarks and questions of the panelists and his responses to panelists.  His 
full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues can be found 
below in the chapter presenting the panel: 
 
 Panelist Response Subjects 
 
Harry HolzerReduced recidivism justifying inmate work subsidies 
 
Wendell Primus Requirements of firms hiring inmates 
Wage and deduction setting to motivate inmates’ work 
 
Steve Schwalb Identifying appropriate foreign-made products for U.S. 
Inmate manufacture 
 
Charles Sullivan Complications providing inmates computers for education  
 
Gregory Woodhead Education, treatment, and jobs policies for inmates vs public 
policies for non-offenders 
 
Thomas Petersik Inmate participation in labor unions 
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The primary question we have been asked to address for this Symposium is: 
 
Are bans on inmate labor force participation  
‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the U.S. economy? 
 
Our answer to this question, subject to qualifications discussed below, is that a ban on 
prison labor is probably ‘bad’ for the economy in the narrow sense that it slightly reduces 
the total output of goods and services in the domestic economy as officially measured by 
figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  As the following calculation suggests, 
however, the potential effect of permitting prison labor on GDP is likely to be quite 
small.  To derive an upper bound estimate of the effect of encouraging prison labor on 
GDP, suppose that all inmates work full time, year round (i.e., 2,000 hours per year), and 
produce output per hour equivalent to the minimum wage ($5.15).  Under these 
assumptions, inmate labor would produce $19 billion of output.  In 1998, total GDP was 
$8.5 trillion in the U.S., so the potential addition of inmate labor to GDP is only 0.2 
percent of total U.S. GDP.   This figure is less than the typical magnitude of “statistical 1
discrepancy” in the National Income Accounts; it is barely noticeable. 
 
We should stress that our calculation probably provides a substantial overestimate 
for several reasons.  First, labor force participation of inmates is likely to be well under 
100 percent even if employment of inmates is encouraged since relatively few inmates 
work when they are not incarcerated.  Second, the average inmate may produce less 
output per hour than the minimum wage, especially once possible additional security 
costs or prison modifications are taken into account.   Third, prison industries already 2
1       1998 GDP is reported by the U.S. Commerce Department in “National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables,”  ​Survey of Current Business​.  The very small amount of output relative to the total in the U.S. 
economy is the same point made by Rod Miller, Mary Shelton, and Tom Petersik, “Inmate Labor in 
America’s Correctional Facilities: A Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association’s Subcommittee 
on Correctional Industries,” Community Resource Services, April 1998. 
2       Inmates worked for wages that averaged 78 cents per hour in prison industries in 1997, so the 
minimum wage may overstate the average productivity of inmates.  This figure is derived from the ratio of 
total inmate wages paid in 1997 (Miller ​et al.​, 1998, Figure 12) to total inmate labor hours (Correctional 
Industries Association, 1998, p. 108). 
produce goods worth about $1.6 billion, so time used to produce this output should be 
deducted from total potential available hours.   Finally, inmates already perform a great 3
deal of uncompensated general work assignments in and around prisons (e.g., cleaning 
the facilities and preparing food) which are not included in GDP as far as we know, so 
this time would also have to be deducted from potential available hours.   4
Even if prison industries contribute a small amount to total output, they are not 
necessarily ‘good’ for the economy.  For example, in a traditional government-operated 
industry, if extra security and supervision costs are required to create an environment that 
permits work compared to the costs of maintaining an environment in which inmates are 
not working, then these extra security costs might exceed the value of the output from the 
industry.  In this case where the industry is not profitable for the government, it should be 
shut down even though some output was being produced, and total GDP raised. 
 
A narrow focus on GDP is not very informative.  We believe a more important 
economic question to address is: 
 
Is the economic value of the social benefits of inmate labor  
greater than the total costs to society? 
 
If the social costs outweigh the benefits, then the government should ban inmate labor. 
Conversely, as long as the social benefits are greater than the costs, then the government 
should encourage inmate labor.  We believe it is critical to focus on social costs and 
benefits and not on GDP, because many of the most economically significant aspects of 
inmate labor are not captured by the dollar value of the goods produced by inmates.5
 
What do we mean by social benefits and costs?  The answer is that policy-makers 
need to estimate as well as possible the dollar value of the various consequences of 
allowing inmate labor.  Some of these values are easily observed, such as the wages that 
private firms are willing to pay the laborers.  Other values are less easily observed, but 
verifiable in principle, such as the net change in the cost of security to the prison for 
3       Gross sales are reported in: Correctional Industries Association. ​1998 Directory: Producing 
Productive People​.  Baltimore, Maryland: Correctional Industries Association, 1998; hereafter abbreviated 
(CIA 1998).  
4       A more accurate measure of GDP would include the value of the service performed by inmates 
engaged in general work assignments.  In principle, general work assignments in prison are services that 
would require performance by at least some non-inmate workers if there were a ban on general work by 
inmates.  It appears to us that a ban on general work by inmates combined with performance of exactly the 
same activities by non-inmate labor that received wages would increase measured GDP, but this is a flaw in 
the measurement of GDP because the output of economic activity is unchanged regardless of whom 
performs the work.  
5       This question essentially combines two of the four main questions we were asked to address.  One 
question was:  “Are bans on inmate labor force participation ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the U.S. economy?” 
Another question was: “If there are any criminal justice or correctional effects distinguishable from 
economic aspects, please identify them  -- particularly their effects on net social benefits and costs.” 
inmates who are working in comparison to those who are not working.  Still other values 
are not directly verifiable, such as the cost of pain and suffering caused by different 
numbers of crimes committed after release by inmates who engaged in inmate labor in 
comparison to those who did not work as inmates; it is possible that permitting prison 
labor could reduce subsequent crimes and recidivism because released prisoners who 
have work experience fare better in the non-institutional economy.  Despite the difficulty 
of precisely quantifying these effects, it would be a mistake ignore these non-verifiable 
values (implicitly assuming they are zero) so there have been many studies that try to 
obtain rough estimates of these values.  We specifically refer to “social” benefits and 
costs because some consequences of inmate labor may affect society-at-large even 
though they do not directly affect the inmate laborer or the employer.  These benefits may 
be realized at the time the labor takes place, or in the future.  For example, if the 
experience of inmate labor decreases criminal activity after release, then there would be 
future benefits from the reduction of pain and suffering associated with crime.  These 
benefits should be discounted to present values.  
 
In the context of the decision about whether to allow inmate labor, the decision is 
much easier if the government allows private employers to bid for the services of the 
inmate labor, provided that the bidders bear any changes in security costs.  When the 
government is not the employer of labor and producer of the goods, it requires much less 
information because it does not need to know the details about the profitability of the 
specific product to be made in order to make decisions about allowing inmate labor. 
Even when the employer is a private firm, the government still needs to assess whether 
there are important social benefits and costs beyond those taken into account by the 
employer (in its decisions about the production of goods and the number and wages of 
inmate laborers) that suggest whether the production should be subsidized or taxed 
because of the government’s interest in other consequences of the employment of inmate 
labor. 
 
We have identified two types of social consequences from inmate labor.  (1). 
Partial equilibrium consequences can be thought of as due to one small enterprise that 
would not have been undertaken if inmate labor were not available.  (2).  General 
equilibrium consequences may occur if there were many enterprises using inmate labor, 
cumulatively large enough to affect the product and labor markets in which they compete.  
 
We believe the most important partial equilibrium social benefits are crime 
reduction, earnings by inmate laborers, and security cost reductions, which are discussed 
below. 
 
Possible reduction in the number of crimes committed by offenders after release​. 
Research suggests that offenders commit 12-15 crimes per year after release, which have 
a large economic cost to society.   There is some evidence that participation in inmate 6
6        For example, see Steven Levitt, “The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence 
from Prison Overcrowding Legislation,” ​Quarterly Journal of Economics​, 1996, 319-251. 
labor provides skills and experience that help former prisoners to forgo crime.  For 
example, the recidivism rate appears to be 3-8% lower for former inmate laborers than 
for those with similar characteristics who were not inmate laborers.   The economic value 7
of this crime reduction could be quite substantial.  For example, if just five percent of 
released prisoners were induced to commit no crimes after being released, compared to a 
situation in which they would commit an average level of crime (say, costing $35,000 in 
the first year after release and gradually declining to zero after fifteen years), the net 
present value that could be saved over the 15 year period would be about $11,000 ​per 
released inmate​.   Moreover, if five percent of released prisoners avoided a two-year 8
prison term after participating in inmate labor, the present value of future incarceration 
costs would be reduced by about $2,800 ​per released inmate​.  9
 
It may also be true, however, that this relationship is not causal and that those 
who choose to participate in inmate labor would have had a lower propensity to engage in 
criminal activity even if they had not worked.  Further study of this recidivism issue 
should be a high priority.  If there were a waiting list of inmates who wanted to work, 
then a random lottery for participation would be both equitable and facilitate study of the 
issue since the group not chosen in the lottery would be a natural control group. 
Alternatively, the opportunity for inmate labor could be made available at some prisons, 
and researchers could compare the experiences of these inmates to that at otherwise 
similar prisons. 
 
Wages paid to inmate labor​.  Benefits accrue to inmates, who have saving to draw 
upon after release, and to their dependents in the form of support payments.  Transfers 
can also be made to victim compensation programs and to the government through taxes 
and payments for room and board.  In the past two decades, prison industry enhancement 
programs have been operating in which $84 million dollars were paid in wages, of which 
7       A study of the federal PREP program (for work experience, vocational and apprenticeship training) 
found that participants had a recidivism rate of 6.6%, in comparison to 10.1% for comparison group with 
similar demographics and criminal history (and 20% overall rate for all prison inmates).  See William 
Saylor and Gerald Gaes, “Training Inmates,” ​Corrections Management Quarterly​, 1:2, 1997, 32-43.  See 
also: Stephen Anderson.  ​Evaluation of the Impact of Participation in Ohio Penal Industries on Recidivism​. 
Columbus, OH: Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 1995.  Comparisons were made 
between inmates with similar reading scores at admission who did and did not later participate in Ohio 
Penal Industries (OPI) work.  For inmates ages 26-30 (22% of the sample) the recidivism rate was 22% for 
the OPI group and 30% for the non-OPI group.  For ages 31-40 (29% of the sample) the recidivism rate 
was 24% for the OPI group and 29% for the non-OPI group.  For other ages, the recidivism rates appear to 
be similar. 
8       The dollar value estimate of $35,000 per year is conservative in the sense that it is somewhat lower 
than the $43,100 estimate of the average dollar value of the cost of crimes excluding murder committed by 
released inmates from Levitt (1996). This illustrative calculation assumes straightline depreciation in the 
dollar value of crime over 15 years, and a discount rate of four percent. 
9        For this calculation, the annual cost of incarceration is assumed to be $30,000.  (See Levitt 1996 for 
citations to estimates ranging from $23,500 to $35,000).  Five percent of prisoners are assumed to be 
released for one year, and then in prison for two years, with a four percent discount rate. 
 
8% were contributed to victims programs, 6% to family support deductions, 12% to 
withheld taxes, and 22% to room and board.   There may also be an increase in 10
employment and earnings in the legitimate labor market after release that would have 
many of the same benefits, as suggested by research on offenders released from federal 
prisons.   As suggested above, further study to determine the causal effect of inmate 11
work programs on later outcomes is a high priority for future research. 
 
Possible reduced security provision by prisons for inmate laborers​.  Employing 
firms may have to provide special security when inmates are working.  Another aspect of 
the security issue, however, is that the operating costs of corrections facilities could be 
lower when firms are occupying 6-8 hours per day of inmates time.  Furthermore, even 
when inmates are not at work, their morale and behavior may have improved so that the 
costs of security are reduced, as suggested by research in New York.   The quantitative 12
magnitude of costs savings from this reduced need for security have yet to be assessed. 
 
In partial equilibrium, we do not believe there are important social costs.  The real 
question for the viability of small enterprises in a partial equilibrium analysis is whether 
enough private firms will choose to employ inmate labor at prevailing wages.  The 
combination of paying prevailing wages for low skills with extra security costs in the 
workplace may not be attractive to employers relative to alternatives.  The social benefits 
provided from reduced crime, redistribution of inmate wages, and reduced prison security 
costs suggest that there could be under-provision of inmate employment and that society 
could be better off if the government provides a subsidy to employment.  13
 
We believe the most important general equilibrium social benefit in the long run 
is the efficiency of production.  Benefits accrue to consumers in the form of lower prices 
and to employing firms who have a larger supply of less-skilled labor willing to work at 
10       CIA 1998, p. 99. 
11      Saylor and Gaes (1997) find that PREP program participants had an employment rate of 72% one year 
after release while non-participating inmates with similar background characteristics had an employment 
rate of 63%. 
12      Kathleen Maguire, “Prison industry programs and inmate institutional behaviour.”  ​Forum on 
Corrections Research​ 8:1, 1996.  The study compares inmates above the 80​th​ percentile in their number of 
institutional infractions prior to participating in inmate labor to a sample of inmates with a similar number 
of infractions during that time period.  In a follow-up, the group that participated in inmate labor had 
incurred 3.3 infractions while working and those who did not work incurred 5.0 infractions.  While the 
results for this high infraction subgroup were statistically significant, there were not significant changes for 
those with a lower number of infractions prior to the inmate labor experience. 
13       One type of subsidy that may be feasible here is a simple wage subsidy.  In general, the wage subsidy 
is thought to be an unattractive policy instrument because it can be easily extorted by an employer who 
reports fraudulently low hours and a high wage -- since usually information on hours is difficult to verify. 
In the case of inmate labor, there is directly accounting for the time the inmate spends with the employer, 
so this usual issue can be resolved. 
low wages.  As pointed out earlier, however, the effect of permitting prison labor on the 
overall economy is likely to be quite small. 
 
It is also our opinion that there are important potential social and distributional 
costs from encouraging prison labor, due to an outward labor supply shift of (mainly) 
unskilled inmate workers that will have consequences for less-skilled civilian workers.  14
The first two columns of the following table compare the education distribution of the jail 
and prison inmates to the general population in 1991.  Inmates are 2.4 times more likely 
to lack a high school diploma or GED than are those in the non-institutional U.S. 
population.   In the third column, we use the education distribution of inmates in 1991 to 15
infer the education levels of the 1.72 million men in jail or prison in 1998, and then report 
the ratio of the number of inmates at each education level relative to the number of men 
in the civilian labor force in the same education category.   These figures provide an 16
indication of the potential magnitude of the labor supply shift due to prison labor by 
education class. Clearly, because so many inmates have a low level of education, the 
supply shift due to permitting prison labor will be greatest for the least skilled 
non-institutional workers. 
                                                 Education   Distribution     Inmates as a Proportion of the 
  ​Inmates​       ​Population​     ​Civilian Male Labor Force, 1998 
 
Less than High School Graduate .47 .21               .105 
GED or High School graduate .38 .36               .033 
At least some college .16 .43                           .008 
 
We estimate that if inmates join the labor force, the number of high school 
dropouts in the labor force will expand by 10.5 percent.  In the long run, this increase in 
supply will probably have a greater effect on wages for less-educated workers in the 
non-institutional workforce, than on their employment (except, of course, for those who 
voluntarily chose to withdraw from the workforce because of the decline in wages).   If 
the labor demand elasticity for this group of workers is -0.5, then wages could fall by as 
much as 5 percent for workers with less than a high school degree if all prisoners join the 
workforce.   This is an upper bound for several reasons: (1) the relevant labor market 17
14       Our discussion of this social cost addresses one of the questions posed to us for this symposium: 
“Will expanded inmate participation in the economy create, destroy, or have no effect on civilian 
employment in the United States?” 
15       U.S. Department of Justice.  ​Profile of Inmates in the United States, England, and Wales, 1991​. 
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994 (NCJ-145863). 
16      The number of prison and jail inmates by sex is reported in:  U.S. Department of Justice.  ​Prison and 
Jail Inmates at Mid-year 1998​.  Washington D.C.:  Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999  (NCJ 173414).  The 
number in the civilian male labor force by education is reported in:  U.S. Department of Labor. 
Employment and Earnings​.  Washington D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 1999, p. 174. 
 
17      An elasticity of –0.5 for total labor demand was the median estimate in a survey of 65 labor 
economists.  See Table 2 of Victor Fuchs, Alan Krueger and James Poterba, “Economists’ Views about 
Parameters, Values, and Policies:  Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics,” ​Journal of Economic 
also includes women; (2) inmates probably have less skill than non-institutional workers 
with the same level of education; (3) only a proportion of inmates will work; (4) some 
fraction of civilian workers may chose to withdraw from the labor force rather take a job 
that pays 5 percent less; (5) the minimum wage provides a floor below which wages 
cannot fall in many companies.  Despite these caveats, this back-of-the-envelope 
calculation provides a rough estimate of the potential impact of prison labor on the 
less-skilled non-institutional labor force.  Moreover, if civilian workers who withdraw 
from the formal labor market because of deteriorating wages are pushed into a life of 
crime, the social costs could be substantial.  
 
Overall, however, despite the large increase in incarceration in the U.S., inmates 
still would be a small fraction of the labor force even if many of them were working. 
While the proportion of the population in prison or jail has doubled since 1985, the 
number of adult men in prison or jail equaled 2.3 percent of the number in the male labor 
force.   For workers with some college, that ratio is under 1 percent.  The 1998 overall 18
employmenttopopulation rate is predicted to be 70.6 percent had the prison population 
been included in the estimates, compared to the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate of 
70.9 percent for the non-institutional population in the hypothetical situation in which all 
incarcerated individuals were added to the civilian, non-institutional population, and 35 
percent were employed.   19
 
In assessing the economic value of the social costs and benefits, the government 
also must consider the distributional consequences.  In this case, the less-skilled labor 
adversely affected by the presence of inmate labor may also as a group be the recipient of 
some of the social benefits.  The reason for this is that they are the same group that is 
most likely to benefit from any reduction in criminal victimization resulting if 
participation in inmate labor programs lowers criminal activity after release.  Some 
members of this group will also benefit from the family support payments made by 
inmate laborers.  A concrete recommendation about the decision the government should 
Literature​, 56 (September 1998), 1387-1425. 
 
18       U.S. Department of Justice.  ​Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1997​.  Washington, DC: 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998 (NCJ 171147). 
19      This analysis is based on Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger, “The High Pressure U.S. Labor Market of 
the 1990s,” forthcoming ​Brookings Papers on Economic Activity​, 1999.  The original analysis considered 
what would have happened to employment if inmates had been released.  Here we consider the implications 
of including inmate laborers in the labor force statistics.  We focus on men because about 90 percent of 
those in prison or jail are men.  Administrative earnings data collected by the California Employment 
Development Department show that 35 percent of individuals who served 12 year sentences in California 
for federal crimes were employed prior to being arrested.  This figure is similar to the employment rate 
those convicted but not sentenced to prison time, two years after their case was filed.  Consequently, we 
assume that 35 percent of those in prison or jail would be working if given the opportunity.  See Jeffrey 
Kling, “The Effect of Prison Sentence Length on the Subsequent Employment and Earnings of Federal 
Criminal Defendants,”  Woodrow Wilson School Economics Discussion Paper 208, January 1999.  For 
U.S. employment and population figures, see the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at www.bls.gov.  
make would be based on the magnitude of these costs and benefits, and a social welfare 
function that places weights on the welfare of the various distributional groups.  It would 
also be important to investigate the relative cost effectiveness of alternatives such as 
education and training for prisoners, which could in principle provide some of the same 
benefits without the distributional consequences for other less-skilled workers who may 
be competing with inmate laborers.  Any serious recommendation would require much 
further research on these issues. 
 
Another question we’ve been asked to address is: 
 
What steps are essential to improve the economic contribution  
of the incarcerated labor force? 
 
As we noted above, we see no theoretical rationale for the government to be the employer 
of inmate labor.  We suspect the contribution of inmate labor to economic output would 
be greater if they were employed by the private sector.  Shifting to an open system of 
private sector employers could also have the benefit of placing all prospective employers 
on a level playing field, without preferences for particular employers or for the purchase 
of prison-made goods.  ​In concert with privatization, we suggest that inmate workers be 
covered by all relevant labor legislation that applies to private sector firms: including the 
right to form a union, fair labor standards, and workplace safety regulations.  
Because inmate laborers do not have the option to “vote with their feet” or shop 
around for alternative, better paying jobs, the potential for inmate labor to be exploited is 
great.  In this situation, unionization may also provide important benefits and protections. 
In order to maximize their economic contribution, inmate labor needs a negotiating agent 
aligned with its interests, and a union could serve as that agent.  A union could take 
responsibility for handling outreach to employers and specialize in handling additional 
security arrangements for inmate labor that would be unfamiliar and costly for each 
private sector employer to undertake.  If the government were to subsidize inmate labor 
because of social benefits, one way to administer the subsidy would be make payments to 
the union that could be used to pay for security and make inmate labor more attractive to 
potential employers.  A union could also provide continuity in managing relations with 
the employer even when there is high turnover in the workforce.  We note that since 
inmate labor is not a critical component of any one private sector industry (in the way 
that, say, airline mechanics are to the airline industry) they would probably not reach 
agreements that lead to supra-competitive wages since employers could substitute with 
other unskilled labor relatively easily.  On the other hand, unionization may lead to a 
more accurate valuation of the general work tasks performed in prisons, although it is not 
clear that this would actually raise prison costs since increases in payments could 
probably be taxed away through charges for room and board.  A union may also be more 
effective in convincing inmates to participate in educational programs that would raise 
their wages, since inmates may (accurately) perceive that this advice is coming from a 
party that has their self-interest in mind. 
 
Another important step in improving the economic contribution of inmate labor 
would be to set the “tax rate” for wage deductions at an appropriate level.  Further 
research will be necessary to better understand their labor supply elasticity (the sensitivity 
of inmate labor force participation to the after-tax pay that they receive), perhaps using 
research designs as described above for studying recidivism, but instead varying the 
wages instead of the availability of work.  As documented above, many former inmates 
do not work after release in the legitimate labor market, but their opportunity costs (e.g. 
other ways to make money, value of leisure time) may be substantially different while 
incarcerated.  If the tax rate is set too high, the maximum social benefits may not be 
produced.  Even the total revenue for available transfers will not be maximized if inmate 
laborers choose not to work at a high tax rate and would have worked more a somewhat 
lower tax rate. 
 
One final point is that, since the economic contribution of inmate labor is likely to 
be a very small addition to GDP, and since the main economic effect of inmate labor 
would follow from a possible reduction in recidivism rates, the government should 
consider whether there are more efficient and effective means than inmate labor to reduce 
future recidivism rates.  For this reason, we wish to reiterate that other strategies for 
reducing recidivism rates and integrating inmates into mainstream society after release 
should also be considered and studied.  Some of these strategies may complement inmate 
labor – such as requiring employers to provide specific on-the-job-skills training – and 
others may be a substitute for inmate labor because they take time that diverts inmates 
away from work – such as requiring general classroom courses in basic reading or the 
control of aggression.  Identifying ways to integrate inmates into mainstream, 





In addition to their presentation, Alan Krueger and Jeffrey Kling also provided comment 
to panelists, extending the detail of  their views on inmate labor force participation.  A 
fuller sense of their views includes understanding both their remarks and their responses 
to panelist questions.  Their full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists 
on the following issues can be found below in the chapter presenting the panel: 
 
● Responses to Panelists by Alan Krueger: 
 
 Panelist Response Subjects 
 
Gus Faucher Minimum Wages and Wage Setting 
Human Capital and Education 
Exploitation and Labor Abuse 
 
Steve Schwalb Repatriating Offshore Jobs (Import Substitution) 
 
Brenda Smith Female Inmate Labor Force Participation 
 
Greg Woodhead Unions 
 
● Responses to Panelists by Jeffrey Kling: 
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I. Introductory Remarks 
II.  
Let me begin with a caveat.  Although I have written widely on economic issues 
related to crime and criminal justice, prior to the invitation to participate in this project I 
was only casually acquainted with the complex issues surrounding inmate labor.  I have 
spent a great deal of time thinking about these questions in recent months and offer my 
opinions below.  My opinions are based upon my training and experiences as an 
economist, as well as a careful reading of  materials I have obtained.  I do not, however, 
have first-hand experience “in the trenches” with respect to prison labor.  Consequently, I 
have attempted to limit my discussion to broad issues, staying away from the nuts and 
bolts of implementation which I am unqualified to address. 
 
With that important limitation in mind, my comments on prison labor are 
structured as follows.  I begin by laying out what I believe to be the important stylized 
facts concerning inmate labor.  These facts will serve as the basis for my judgments about 
a number of questions.  First, how big an effect on Gross Domestic Product do bans on 
prison labor have? Second, how might prison labor policies be designed to create the 
greatest economic benefits?  Third, who would be the winners and losers if existing 
limitations were removed?   Fourth, what other issues besides narrow economic 
considerations need to be taken into account when determining optimal policies with 
respect to prison labor.  
 
II. Stylized Facts  
 
There are a number of key stylized facts related to inmate labor that will dictate 
many of the conclusions I later present.  I begin by outlining these “facts.” 
 
Fact 1: By any macroeconomic measure, prison labor is currently and will almost 
certainly remain a small (though not necessarily trivial) fraction of the economy even if 
restrictions on prison industries are abolished​.  
 
Given the current set of restrictions on how prison labor can be utilized, at the 
present time most prisoners do not work in jobs producing output that will be sold. 
Miller, Shilton, and Petersik (1998) report that in 1997, 76,519 inmates worked in 
correctional industry jobs, generating gross sales of $1.6 billion dollars.  These 76,519 
inmates represent less than 6/100ths of one percent of the United States labor force. 
Moreover, because prisoners tend to have lower output per worker, the impact of prison 
labor as a fraction of GDP is less than half as large as its share of the labor force.  In the 
U.S. economy, about one billion dollars of output are produced each hour.  Thus the total 
annual output of prison industries represents less than two hours worth of U.S. GDP. 
 
A separate question is how important prison labor might be in the future if 
restrictions on its use were removed.  Once again, the answer is that prison labor will be a 
small part of the overall economy. Even if every prisoner in the United States were 
employed full-time (assuming here constant output per worker-hour), prison-produced 
goods and services would account for only 0.4 percent of GDP. 
 
Fact 2: Prison labor, on average, is relatively unproductive due both to the composition 
of the prisoner pool and the structural impediments that prisons pose as workplaces. 
 
While many prisoners are no doubt highly motivated and productive workers, 
prisoners are not an ideal work force.  Prisoners tend to have less education than the U.S. 
workforce as a whole.   They also tend to have uneven past work histories and 1
labor-force attachment.  As a consequence, the pool of prison labor is a relatively 
unskilled one, making it an unattractive workforce for employers, at least at prevailing 
wages, 
1  Jeffrey Kling and Alan Krueger provide an excellent discussion of this issue in their 
paper prepared for this symposium. 
 
Also, there are important structural impediments to producing goods in prisons. 
First, turnover rates among prison workers are high due to release from prison: roughly 
forty percent of the prison population is released each year.  In private sector 
manufacturing, a turnover rate of production workers above twenty percent annually 
would be deemed unacceptable.  Such turnover is costly to employers and also 
discourages training since the employer will have less time to recoup any investment 
made.    There are also disruptions to production as a result of periodic lockdowns. 
 
Given these facts, it is not surprising that prison labor, on average, is not very 
productive.  By my rough calculations, output per prisoner-hour worked is about one 
third as great as for the typical American worker.   Because of this low productivity level, 2
prison industries tend not to be profitable.  Evidence of this lack of profitability comes 
from the fact that the Prison Enhancement Industries (PIE) program, which requires 
prison industry to compete on relatively equal footing to private industry, has not thrived. 
As of June 30, 1997, less than 3,000 prisoners were employed in all PIE programs across 
the United States. 
 
Fact 3: The current system of prison industry is characterized by a non-level playing 
field. 
 
When an economist speaks of a “level playing field,” it means that all competitors 
have access to the same set of rules, resources, and markets for their products.  A level 
playing field also requires keeping the government out of decisions that can be made by 
the market, such as determining who will produce a particular good or be given access to 
a particular set of workers.  As a general economic proposition, a level playing field is an 
important ingredient of economic efficiency. 
 
It is clear that the current situation with respect to prison labor is not characterized 
by a level playing field.  Prisoners are not covered by the same set of labor laws as the 
rest of the work force.  Prisoners are exempt from the Fair Standards Labor Act (FLSA) 
that dictates a minimum hourly wage and imposes other constraints on employer 
behavior.   Prison-made products are often given preferential treatment with respect to 
government purchases.  At the same time, in many states prison industries are restricted 
as to the markets they are allowed to serve.  Finally, it is unclear how or why certain 
private companies are granted access to prison laborers and others are not.  Because there 
is no free market for prisoner labor, allocation of such labor is likely to be governed 
primarily by political rather than economic considerations.  3
2  Prisoners may also be disproportionately employed in jobs that are not capital 
intensive.  This would also contribute to the lower marginal product of prison laborers.  
3  Although PIE programs come closer to achieving a level playing field, the rules 
governing PIE industries nonetheless retain some undesirable aspects.  For instance, 
given that prison labor is generally less productive than the workforce available to private 
companies, the requirement concerning paying prevailing wages in PIE programs tilts the 
 
Fact 4: Reasonable estimates suggest that the social costs of crimes committed by 
criminals when not incarcerated are far greater than the typical prisoner’s contribution 
to GDP. 
 
A series of academic studies have attempted to calculate the frequency with which 
the incarcerated population commits crime when not behind bars (DiIulio and Piehl 1991, 
Levitt 1996, Piehl and DiIulio 1995, Spelman 1994), as well as the costs that such crimes 
impose on victims (Cohen 1988, Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 1993).  My reading of this 
literature is that the “marginal” criminal (i.e. the inmate who would be let out if the 
prison population were reduced by one using whatever arbitrary procedure is currently in 
place for determining who goes to prison and for how long) commits 1-2 violent crimes 
and roughly 10 property crimes annually.  The cost of these crimes to victims (in lost 
property, injuries, psychic costs, lost years of life, and missed work) is roughly $35,000 
per criminal per year.  If one focuses on the “average” inmate rather than the “marginal” 
inmate, the costs of crime to victims are much higher: perhaps $80,000 per criminal per 
year.   For purposes of comparison, the average annual output per prison worker in 1997 4
was approximately $20,000 – smaller than the damage done in crime when free.  While 
these numbers do not speak directly to the question of whether or not prisoners should be 
allowed to work while incarcerated, these facts will be relevant in the final section of the 
paper where I highlight the importance of thinking not just about the narrow economic 
issues, but also on the relationship between prison labor and recidivism.  Because the 
social costs of crime are so high, a policy that reduces recidivism can have a social 
benefit that far outweighs a prisoner’s narrow contribution to GDP. 
 
III. How big an effect on Gross Domestic Product do bans on prison labor have? 
 
I approach answering this question by (1) establishing a likely upper bound on the 
amount of GDP that might be generated by prisoners under ideal circumstances, (2) 
considering a range of issues that make it likely the upper bound estimates are too large, 
and (3) thinking about the winners and losers. 
 
An upper bound 
 
A simple back-of-the envelope calculation as to the potential contribution of 
playing field against prison industry.  If prisoners are less skilled, than output per worker 
will be lower and prevailing wages are not appropriate (perhaps prevailing wages per unit 
of output, rather than unit of time worked would be more fitting).  On the other hand, PIE 
industries do not appear to pay their full share of the overhead costs of prison 
management, which tilts the playing field in their favor. 
4  The difference between the marginal and the average prisoner suggests that judges, 
juries, and parole boards are able to determine which prisoners are most dangerous and 
tend to lock these individuals up for greater periods of time. 
prison labor to GDP takes output per inmate-hour as fixed and makes some assumption 
on how many inmates might reasonably be employed in industry jobs.  Given the high 
turnover rates in jails, it is likely that jail-based production will be economically 
inefficient.  The prison inmate population as of December 1997 was approximately 1.2 
million.  Although it is unrealistic to think every prisoner could be employed full time, I 
will begin with that premise.  Given current output per prisoner-hour (based on numbers 
presented in Miller, Shilton, and Petersik (1998)) of $14.56, if every prisoner worked 
full-time, then annual prison industry output would be $35 billion annually.  In my 
opinion, this represents an extreme upper bound that is unlikely ever to be realized. 
 
 To put this number into perspective, even in the extreme case where we went 
from a situation where no prisoners worked to one in which all prisoners worked, GDP 
would increase by about 0.4 percent.  In comparison, between 1991 and 1997, the U.S. 
economy grew 18.3 percent in real terms.  So the potential economic impact we are 
talking about is small relative to the macroeconomic changes that have taken place in 
recent years.  On the other hand, the potential output that could be generated by prisoners 
is by no means trivial.  Divided equally across all Americans, this translates into an 
additional $125 per person annually.  This is a substantial amount of production, and if it 
were straightforward to achieve this increment to GDP it would absolutely be a goal 
worth pursuing. 
 
A more realistic conjecture 
 
There are many reasons, however, to think that the estimates above dramatically 
overstate the probable increase in GDP associated with lifting prison labor restrictions. 
First, it is unlikely that all prisoners would be employed in industry jobs.  Fifty percent 
participation might be a more reasonable assumption.  Second, it may be that as the 
prison labor force is expanded, the marginal worker has fewer skills and a lower 
commitment to working, translating into a lower level of output per worker.  Third, not 
all of the prison industry output would necessarily represent a true increase in GDP. 
Some of the output is likely to be replacing other production that would have otherwise 
taken place outside of the prison (perhaps at a higher cost).  In other words, just as some 
U.S. jobs are lost when production moves to foreign countries, a parallel story could hold 
for prisons.  Fourth, only a portion of the total value of goods and services produced in 
prison truly reflects “value added” on the part of the prisoners.  If a prison industry buys a 
widget for $10, adds bells and whistles to the widget, and resells the widget for $15, then 
the actual increment to GDP associated with the prison industry is only $5 per widget. 
 
Taken together, I think that these factors suggest that a reasonable estimate of the 
true increment to GDP that would result from putting prisoners to work without 
restrictions might be $5-10 billion dollars a year, or less than one-third of the 
upper-bound estimate presented above.  Nonetheless, an additional $5-10 billion dollars 
annually is a substantial amount of production and if there is a way to achieve this 
production it should be pursued. 
 
IV.  How might prison labor policies be designed to create the greatest economic 
benefits?  
 
As noted in the introduction, I do not intend to offer specific opinions about the 
day-to-day operation of prison industry.  Rather, I focus here on a few “big picture” 
issues anchored in one fundamental economic principle: economic efficiency requires a 
level playing field. 
 
Economic efficiency begins with production being done by the lowest-cost 
producer.  By costs, I don’t mean accounting costs, but rather true resource costs.  For 
instance, if the government allows one producer access to prison labor that is subsidized 
by virtue of the government paying the costs of the physical plant and requiring prisoners 
to work for extremely low wages, then that producer may be able to sell output more 
cheaply than a competitor.  But it may be economically inefficient because the producer 
is being subsidized by taxpayer dollars spent on maintaining the prison.  It also may be 
inefficient because a second producer, given access to cheap prison labor, could have 
produced at even lower cost.  Finally, it may be inefficient because different producers 
spend money attempting to lobby the government for the right to gain access to the cheap 
prison labor. 
 
The current system of prison labor regulation has all of these potential 
inefficiencies built into it.  As well, by giving preferences to prison-made goods in some 
cases (e.g. government purchases), and restricting the sale of prison-made goods in other 
instances, the present set of rules further distorts economic choices in ways that are likely 
to adversely affect economic efficiency.  My advice, therefore, would be to dismantle the 
current set of regulations, put all competitors on a level-playing field, and let the market 
dictate the outcome. 
 
Putting all competitors on a level-playing field would entail the following four 
changes.   It is important to note that I view each of the four elements as critical to a 5
successful transition to a more rational utilization of prison labor.  If any one of the 
elements were to be omitted, the program would be unlikely to be completely successful. 
 
First, I would privatize prison industry.  As long as the government is in charge of 
prison industries, it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid decisions being made with 
political rather than economic justifications.  Furthermore, the difficulty in allocating 
costs between prison overhead and the prison industry will be impossible to solve. 
 
Second, every prison system that wants to have inmates employed in prison 
industries should put the rights to use those workers out to a competitive bid of 
5  To reiterate my definition of level paying field is a situation where everyone plays by 
the same rules and the government stays out of decisions that are better made by the 
market. 
prospective employers.  The prison would stipulate certain conditions (e.g. the length of 
contract, types of training required, wages to be paid, etc.), and subject to agreeing to 
those terms, the highest bidder would obtain the rights to access the prison labor.  6
Individual prisoners would have the right to choose whether or not they wanted to 
participate in the prison labor force, just as individuals who are not incarcerated have this 
choice.  It would be incumbent on the private company to provide wages and working 
conditions that are attractive enough that prisoners would choose to accept the jobs. 
Voluntary participation on the part of prisoners is especially important given the potential 
exploitation of prison labor that has sometimes occurred in the past. 
 
In my opinion, this competitive bidding system is critical to any proposal to 
liberalize the regulation of prison labor​.​  This system has a number of attractive features: 
no company can complain that another company has an unfair advantage because of 
access to prison labor since the complaining company had their chance to bid, it brings 
revenue directly to the state via bids, and if it is economically inefficient to use prison 
labor then there will be no bidders and production will not occur.  Under this system it 
would be fine for the government to pay the costs of guards and the physical structure.  If 
they do so, private companies will bid higher for the right to use the prison labor, so in 
the end the market will take care of it. 
 
The third change that would be useful in leveling the playing field would be to 
extend current civilian labor laws to cover prisoners.  In particular, I think minimum 
wages dictated by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should apply, as should 
employer requirements concerning workers comp, contributions to Social Security, etc. 
While not critical to my proposal, perhaps prisoners would also be allowed to unionize 
(how this might be best accomplished is one of the factors I feel unqualified to address). 
It is quite reasonable for the government to garnish prisoner wages to pay for maintaining 
prisons, providing support to dependents of those incarcerated (there are more children of 
inmates than inmates), or victim compensation.   The key point is not to pay the inmates 7
a particular wage, but rather to put the choice between prison labor and civilian labor on 
an equal footing.  If the prison labor is more profitable given the same set of rules, then 
the prison labor should be used rather than civilian labor and vice versa. 
 
The fourth and final change that I propose would be to eliminate all preferences 
and restrictions with respect to prison-made goods.  No one should be required to buy 
prison-made goods and no one should be prohibited from doing so if they want to.  Since 
prison industries would be producing on the same terms as all others, they should be able 
6  It may even be the case that the government would be willing to accept negative bids if 
prison industries have other social benefits, such as reduced recidivism or making it 
easier to control prisons. 
7  Dividing up the prisoner’s wage is a very tricky and important issue.  In my opinion, it 
is fundamentally a political decision rather than an economic one.  The various 
stakeholders would undoubtedly want to be involved in such a decision. 
to sell their goods on the same terms. 
 
Winners and Losers 
 
Economic winners and losers from a liberalization of prison labor depend 
critically on the way in which the program is implemented.  Given that I outlined what I 
think is a reasonable set of rules for liberalizing inmate labor in the preceding section, I 
will focus my efforts here on describing what I think would be the likely distributional 
consequences of the program outlined above, rather than attempt to conjecture about the 
full range of possible liberalization schemes.  8
 
I think the single most likely outcome of the liberalization I propose is that very 
little prison labor will actually be utilized if competitive bids are required to be positive. 
In other words, I believe that most prison industries, if they had to pay the minimum 
wage, would not be profitable.  So for the sake of argument, let me take a case where bids 
to use prison labor can be negative (i.e. the government pays a company to produce using 
prisoners) and the bulk of prisoners are employed. 
 
Relative to the current situation, the only clear losers that I see in my scheme are 
the executives at UNICOR and state-run prison industries (which would cease to exist in 
my framework, or at least would have to compete with private companies for prison 
labor), and the handful of private companies that currently use prison labor at government 
subsidized rates.  With competitive bidding, these companies will be forced to pay the 
full value of the access to prison labor. 
 
The clear winners in this program are the businesses that previously competed 
against prison industries, the government, prisoners and their families, consumers, and 
taxpayers.  Businesses no longer have to face subsidized competitors and now have equal 
access to prison labor.  The government is better off since private companies are likely to 
produce more efficiently than government run industries, and therefore these private 
prison industries will be willing to pay more (or perhaps accept lower subsidies) than 
would be required for the government to directly run the business.  Also, by putting the 
inmate labor out to competitive bids, the government will capture much of the surplus 
that existing privately-run prison industries have likely been collecting.  Since the 
government will still be able to garnish wages from the prisoners, having more prisoners 
working generates more government revenue.  Prisoners are better off because more of 
them will be working and given that the prison industries are run by private companies, 
the way in which the businesses run are likely to be more similar to civilian jobs than is 
currently the case.  Although prisoner wages will be heavily garnished as is currently the 
8For example, if we keep our present system of preferences and subsidies, but remove all 
restrictions on the markets to which prison industries can sell, the companies that 
compete with the prison industries, as well as their workers, are likely to be hurt.  How 
badly depends critically on how concentrated the output of prison industries would be if 
such a liberalization occurred. 
practice, in my scheme prison labor would qualify for social security benefits. 
Furthermore, working conditions might improve if existing labor laws are applied to 
prisoners.  Finally, consumers should benefit from the fact that the playing field has been 
leveled, resulting in production being done as efficiently as possible.  This should 
manifest itself in lower prices for goods and lower taxes to pay for prisons. 
 
The final stakeholder that I have not yet talked about is civilian workers/labor 
unions.  The impact on such workers is unclear.  By enforcing FLSA and other labor 
laws, my scheme eliminates many of the existing subsidies to prison labor.    From that 
perspective, it reduces low-wage competition and benefits labor.  It would also allow 
prison workers to unionize, which would be beneficial to organized labor.  On the other 
hand, by eliminating restrictions on the sale of prison-made goods, my plan is likely to 
generate some competition as well.  Indeed, if the number of prison workers go up as I 
envision would be the case, the overall level of competition with private labor will have 
increased.  The effect is likely to be relatively minor, however.  The rise in the labor force 
associated with putting prisoners to work is about one percent.  The labor market 
frequently absorbs shocks of this magnitude with ease.  Low-skilled civilian workers are 
likely to be hurt more since prisoners are largely unskilled and will compete directly with 
these workers.  The impact on low-skilled workers requires further study to make an 
accurate assessment.  In general, labor economics suggests that any adverse impact on 
civilian employment is likely to occur primarily in the short run (five years or less).  Over 
time, labor markets will move back into equilibrium with little impact on civilian 
employment, but potentially some small permanent decline in wages of low-skilled 
civilians. 
 
V.  Beyond narrow economic considerations: does prison labor reduce recidivism? 
 
To this point, I have focused exclusively on the narrow question of economic 
efficiency, as the organizers of this conference have requested.  In my opinion, however, 
the question of whether putting prisoners to work reduces recidivism is also of critical 
importance. 
 
As noted in the stylized facts presented in the beginning of this paper, existing 
estimates of the social costs of crime committed by prisoners when free are on the order 
of $30,000 a year.  If working a prison job has even a relatively small impact on 
recidivism, the social benefits could be enormous.  For instance, if working a prison job 
resulted in 10 percent of prisoners dropping out of crime upon their release, then the 
annual social benefit from reduced crime would be $6.1 billion.   9
 
My reading of the (very limited) existing literature on recidivism and prison labor, 
however, leads me to believe that working in prison industry is unlikely to yield a large 
9  One rationale for allowing negative bids in the auction for prison labor described earlier 
in the paper is that putting prisoners to work might have a beneficial impact on future 
recidivism. 
recidivism benefit.  Although there are a handful of studies of federal, Florida, and Ohio 
prisoners that find lower recidivism rates among prison workers relative to non-workers, 
the critical concern in interpreting these studies is whether the prisoners who worked are 
in fact comparable to those who did not work.  In particular, one worries that the workers 
were more motivated than the non-workers and that motivation is itself an important 
determinant of recidivism likelihood.  Consequently, the impact of having a prison job on 
later recidivism may not be causal.  Evidence presented by Maguire et al. (1988) tends to 
support this less sanguine interpretation of the data.  Looking at almost 2,000 New York 
inmates, they find that those who worked in prison were less likely to recidivate than 
non-workers, but once a range of prisoner characteristics such as prior felony arrests, 
military service, time served, and marital status are controlled for, having worked in 
prison no longer predicts lower recidivism rates. 
 
It is surprising that so little research has been devoted to this important question. 
The ideal way to attempt to answer this question in the future is through randomized 
experiments in which prisoners are divided into two pools: one that is eligible to 
participate in prison industry and another which is not.   By comparing future recidivism 10
across these two groups, an estimate of the independent contribution of prison labor in 




In addition to his presentation, Steven Levitt also provided comment to panelists, 
extending the detail of his views on inmate labor force participation.  A fuller sense of his 
views includes understanding both his remarks and his responses to panelist questions. 
His full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues 
can be found below in the chapter presenting the panel: 
 
 Panelist Response Subjects 
 
Wendell Primus Voluntary Labor 
Structuring Incentives 
 
Brenda Smith Female Inmate Labor Force Participation 
Distribution of Inmate Earnings 
 
10  There may be some ethical concerns associated with prohibiting some prisoners from 
working, but to the extent that there are fewer jobs than prisoners, this may be less of a 
concern since not all prisoners would have worked anyway. 
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Following their presentations, the five economists were 
queried by a panel of key stakeholder interests. The panel 
was designed to identify key applications, extensions, 
problems, inconsistencies, and unresolved issues affecting 
inmate labor force participation. Listed alphabetically 
(and also in their order of appearance), the panelists and 
their interests were – 
 
● Gus Faucher, U.S. Department of Treasury (Taxpayers) 
● Linda Haithcox, National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, Minorities) 
● Harry Holzer, U.S. Department of Labor (Labor) 
● Wendell Primus, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
(Children and Families) 
● Steve Schwalb, Federal Prison Industries (FPI) 
● Brenda Smith, American University (Women) 
● Charles Sullivan, Citizens United for Rehabilitation 
of Errants (Inmates and Inmate Families) 
● Gregory Woodhead, American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
 
A scheduled panelist from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was 
unable to participate. 
 
The speakers were also joined by Neal H. Rosenthal, 
Associate Commissioner for the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Mr. Rosenthal introduced 
the morning session with statistics on the composition of 
and forecasts for the U.S. labor force.  Amy Kaslow, 
moderator of the symposium, interjects a few questions, and 
Thomas Petersik, organizer of the symposium, adds two 
questions at the end. 
 
Each panelist was allotted 10 minutes for query and for 
interactions with other panel members. 
 
The text below presents the panel as it occurred, minimally 






Gus Faucher is a senior economist for labor market issues 
in the Office of Policy of the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
The Office of Policy provides general economic analysis on 
policy issues to senior Treasury staff, including to the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Treasury. 
 
Linda Haithhcox is Director of Economic Development for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP).  Starting in 1981, the NAACP Economic Development 
Program began turning to the private sector as a foundation 
for economic advancement of African Americans, with 
principal objectives of promoting entrepreneurship among 
African Americans and employment opportunities with private 
sector companies, including minority vendor programs, 
aggressive affirmative action, and opportunities for 
advancement. 
 
Harry J. Holzer is currently Chief Economist at the U.S. 
Department of Labor.  He is on leave from Michigan State 
University, where he is professor of Economics.  His 
interests include employer hiring practices and the labor 
market for disadvantaged workers, including at-risk youth 
and ex-offenders. 
 
Wendell E. Primus is Director of the Income Security 
Division of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a 
nonpartisan research and policy institute analyzing 
government policies, emphasizing effects on low and 
moderate income people.  The Income Security Division 
researches issues in Social Security, unemployment 
insurance, income and poverty trends, Federal policies 
under the 1996 welfare reform, and income assistance and 
human service programs. 
 
Steve Schwalb is the Assistant Director and Chief Operating 
Officer of Federal Prison Industries, Inc.  FPI is a 
wholly-owned government corporation of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons operating under the trade name UNICOR, primarily 
as a correctional program teaching marketable work skills 
by providing job training and useful employment 
opportunities in diversified work programs for inmates 
serving in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.  At the end of 
Fiscal Year 1998, FPI operated 99 factories in 64 prisons 
and employed over 1,600 staff and 20,200 inmates. 
 
Brenda V. Smith is an Associate Professor at the Washington 
College of Law at the American University, former Director 
of the Women in Prison Project of the National Women’s Law 
Center, and author of several publications on women in 
prison. 
 
Charles Sullivan is Executive Director of CURE (Citizens 
United for Rehabilitation of Errants), a National prison 
reform organization with 30 chapters and over 10,000 
members.  CURE goals are (1) to use prisons only for those 
who absolutely have to be in them, and (2) to give those 
who absolutely have to be in them all the opportunities 
they need to turn their lives around. 
 
Gregory Woodhead is a Senior Economist in the Public Policy 
Department of the AFL-CIO, a voluntary federation of 
national and international labor unions representing 
affiliate unions in the creation and execution of national 
and international policies.  The Public Policy Department 






MR. FAUCHER:  I am Gus Faucher, an economist at the 
Treasury Department, specializing in labor market issues. 
Tom Petersik asked me to give the taxpayer perspective.  
 
There were three points that struck me in this morning's 
discussions from the papers.  The first is at least we 
think that it is a good idea for inmates to work, 
particularly that it might reduce recidivism.  And Jeff 
Kling raised the point that it might be interesting to 
conduct a random experiment and to find out if indeed it 
does work.  As an economist, I would find that an 
interesting topic.  So we think that it is a good idea for 
inmates to work, both for themselves, but also for society 
in general. 
 
We are also concerned, however, about unfair 
competition.  We are concerned about subsidies that go to 
employers of prison labor.  And we are concerned about the 
effect that inmate labor might have on, particularly, 
low-skilled workers in the economy. 
 
Third, and Richard Freeman and Alan Krueger 
brought this point up, that we think that inmates are going 
to have low productivity, which makes a lot of sense. 
Obviously, if they are committing crimes they probably 
don't have good labor market opportunities.  
 
They tend to be poorly educated.  So we are concerned about 
what they will be producing. 
 
If we are concerned about unfair competition, we 
want inmates to earn minimum wage.  However we also think 
that employers probably won't be willing to hire them at 
the minimum wage.  And my question is, what is the 
interaction there and how do we prevent the unfair 
competition and yet ensure that these inmates are going to 
be hired and what is the interaction with minimum wage in 
prison labor?  I think Alan Krueger has done a lot of work 
on the minimum wage, and I would be particularly interested 
in hearing his thought on this. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  Thanks.  I think that Gus raises a number of 
important points.  On the minimum wage, what I would 
recommend is that, I think he is right that a number of 
inmates would have trouble earning minimum wage in prison, 
in part because of their low human capital and in part 
because of the circumstances in prison would prevent some 
types of businesses from operating.  You can't run a 
McDonald's, I presume, in prison. 
 
I don't think that prison labor is for everyone. 
 
And I think that, especially if we take a longer horizon, 
one would want to try to raise the skills of those people 
who are in prison.  So I would think about ways of trying 
to raise the human capital of those who are in prison who 
would earn so little that they couldn't get a job in the 
labor force anyway after they are out of prison.  So I 
think that is one partial answer for that question. 
 
There are some circumstances, I suppose, where 
one would entertain permitting a sub-minimum wage.  This 
is, I think, in part why Richard recommended trying to 
compete with non-American labor, which in many cases is 
paid less than the American minimum wage.  And that is 
something that I would consider.  
 
But I think as a general policy, one has to worry about 
inmate labor being exploited since they can't pick and 
choose their employers, which would make me think very 
seriously about extending as many of the labor standards as  
 
MR. HOLZER:  Thank you. As a representative of the 
Department of Labor, I was very pleased that all four 
speakers spoke sympathetically about applying fair labor 
standards to prison workers.  And I believe all four 
speakers, at least as a broad concept, expressed some 
interest in the possibility of trying to unionize prison 
laborers, though I have a little hard time seeing how that 
might work in reality.  But at least as a general principal 
it was an interesting thought. 
 
I would try to push that consensus toward next steps in 
terms of specific policy actions.  What I think I heard is 
maybe that all four speakers would favor, on the one hand, 
relaxing the protections that UNICOR now enjoys, not only 
to its monopoly status in federal procurement, but also in 
terms of its ability to pay prison workers, well below 
minimum wage standards. 
 
At the same time, maybe the speakers would favor some 
relaxation of the restrictions on private employers in the 
Prison Industries Enhancement Act, so whether it leaves 
room there for some trade off, again, of putting more 
pressure on UNICOR at the same time of some lifting of 
restrictions in the private sector, all within the context 
of maintaining labor standards, and is there a sort of 
practical way of doing that? 
 
The other brief question, what I heard all the speakers 
saying, that by far the big effect would be on recidivism 
of ex-offenders.  And what I heard was a subtext of 
potential for positive externalities [benefits] for the 
rest of society, which runs a little bit counter to the 
kind of level-the-playing-field argument that Alan 
[Krueger], Jeff [Kling], and Steve [Levitt] were making. 
If you believe that there is a real possible externality, 
is there, in fact, some reason for government subsidies 
here to help, or what is the most appropriate form of 
government subsidy or government investment in these 
workers to offset any of those disadvantages that they are 
going to experience in the labor market? 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  I thought that Steve [Levitt] put this 
correctly.  He said that some contracts with all the 
externalities were great, the contracts could very well be 
the real way to pay you to run a prison industry operation. 
And I think the same is true of minimum wage, since you are 
deducting, you will be taking away some money from the 
people for their room and board, there are a lot of places 
to cut deals to make subsidies or otherwise make them more 
competitive.  Because I am sure that one could, let's say 
 
the prison labor really was below minimum wage, but we 
thought there were these big externalities. 
 
We have just two studies that one finds credible on 
recidivism.  One is a pretty big effect, the one Jeff 
[Kling] mentioned.  And then there is a state study that 
doesn't show these effects.  So I think it is absolutely 
critical, on the government side, to first decide do we 
really get a big recidivism effect.  And the federal prison 
industry study said just a big effect from trading.  It was 
about the same magnitude as was the effect from the work. 
So that gets to this human capital thing that Alan 
[Krueger] mentioned.  That looked as effective as did the 
actual prison inmate thing itself. 
 
So then you want to say well, which one of those two is 
cheaper to run and which would you have to subsidize less. 
But given that, I can imagine there are many ways to write 
contracts here that would enable us to accomplish what we 
want socially and to provide subsidies to hopefully to the 
right people to do what we want done. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  It seems to me that there are several 
problems involved in the assumption that people couldn't 
earn the minimum wage.  One is to compare the whole prison 
population.  You have got a selective workforce in prison 
industries.  So that is not the same population at all.  So 
you have to look at that. 
 
Then the second problem with many of the studies is that 
they are based on the system as it exists, not the way it 
could be.  So that is the reason I prefer the design 
project.  Let's try some things to see if it can, in fact, 
work because there is nobody arguing that the present 
system is as good as it could be, even if you don't believe 
that it is a horrible system.  It certainly could be 
improved a good bit.  
 
And the concept of balancing competitive forces is fairly 
well established in trade policy.  I mentioned the adverse 
effect wage rate, and I think we could learn some things 
from that. 
 
As to what you subsidize, we should have learned a lot from 
economic development.  You subsidize human capital 
development, not industry.  You don't need to subsidize the 
industry.  The subsidy you give the industry doesn't have 
to pay the full cost of developing the people, but you 
could negotiate the balancing part of that process. 
 
It is not hard to see how the unionization would work 
either.  One advantage of studying history and of having 
been around and take part in a good bit of it is that I 
remember when they told us that government employees could 
never unionize.  And therefore, it would never happen, 
Franklin Roosevelt said, and should not.  You shouldn't 
 
allow, and even though he is reported to have said, “If I 
were a working American today, the first thing I would do 
is join a union,” he was ready to make an exception for 
government employees.  Today, government employees are 
unionized.  They don't all strike.  They don't all have the 
right to strike.  
 
I would also point out that a careful study of that would 
be to say what kind of strikes are going on now in the 
prisons. Even if you don't have a formal strike, you get 
informal strikes, what industrial nations people call a 
strike in detail.  That is, protest against the system as 
exists now because you have no other way to have an outlet 
for your grievances. 
 
I think that it would be useful.  That is where I 
think some comparative work would pay off.  It could very 
well be that you greatly improve the process by giving 
inmates voice in the formulation of the rules in the 
industries where they work.  I am not talking about 
organizing, unionizing all prisoners.  That is a different 
matter.  But if they are going to be competing with 
unionized employers in the private sector, it is hard for 
me to see what the justification is for them not to be able 
to form unions. 
 
Now, I also learned as a mediator if a word is causing you 
trouble, drop it.  So if union causes trouble, 
 
let's say an inmates council.  And then see how you would 
need to structure that so that it would really be 
effective. The worst inmates council could very well be a 
company union.  That is to say, something the warden 
created and picked the people on it to tell him what he 
wanted to hear. Well, that is not very useful to the 
warden.  It is not useful to improving the performance of 
the system. The logic to the collective bargaining is that 
the people who have the problem formulate the rules to deal 
with it.  And that if the parties bring to the table their 
relative interest and perspectives, you get much better 
rules than you would get any other ways.  And I think that 
a logical case can be made. 
 
I think it needs to made voluntary just like it is in the 
private sector.  If inmates saw the needs for an inmates 
council, they could then participate in it.  I think what 
you have to guard against with a population that is easily 
exploited is that what appears to be voluntary might be 
very involuntary.  It is like it was when I was in the 
Navy.  They say everybody wants to take out life insurance 
step forward.  Company forward, march!  It wasn't voluntary 
at all.  So there are all kinds of ways, and I think that 
requires that the inmates really have an independent source 
of power, independent from the system, to make it possible 
for it to work most effectively. 
 
And as I say, I don't know it can be done, because the 
other lesson I have learned is that the obvious is often 
wrong and that you never can tell by deductive logic what 
will really work.  That is the reason I have a preference 
for the experiments, for actually doing it to see if you 
can make it work someplace. 
 
MS. HAITHCOX:  Good morning.  My name is Linda Witherspoon 
Haithcox.  I direct the economic development programs of 
the NAACP.  And before I make my brief comments on the 
issues that have been discussed here, I would like to at 
least make a point of saying that I think in these kinds of 
forums the presenters and the panelists should be 
reflective of the issue that is at hand.  And although the 
presenters are very educated and very astute economists, I 
am very curious to know if any of the panel has, in fact, 
interviewed or been in a prison system, talked with an 
inmate, and that that is really who needs to be here to 
discuss the issue.  I did not hire them, but I am concerned 
because certainly representing people of color, 
representing women, and discussing an issue that impacts 
our communities more so than others, we need to make sure 
that all voices are being heard.  So on that note, I will 
move on and discuss or comment on the presenters' issues. 
 
I would like to commend Mr. Marshall and Mr. Freeman for 
their models.  I agree that there does need to be some 
standardization.  Unionization is a little too far out for 
me.  A little too far out.  Everybody can't be part of a 
union.  But I do appreciate that all of the presenters 
obviously had similar findings, which leads you to believe 
that there needs to be other research and other studies. 
And also, the panel should be reflective of Corporate 
America. 
 
In fact, as you were talking, Mr. Marshall, I thought about 
the privatization of the prison system, and what impact 
that would have on profit margins and on the labor force. 
Let's just take an example that if a company decided to 
make an investment into a prison system and then were able 
to utilize that workforce and call them employees, and they 
could do that, what impact would that have? 
 
One of the other issues and concerns I have is re-entry. 
That is always the issue in our community.  Once inmates 
are in the process or being prepared for re-entry into 
their community, the skill, and their skill level or no 
 
level at all in some cases.  And we joke a lot and look at 
the programs like the HBO "Oz".  And I was talking with one 
of the other people in the audience about another HBO 
series that came on recently about Lorton prison.  And that 
is the real sign of what is going on.  We can sit here and 
talk about all of the tax issues, all the economy and how 
it impacts the world. The reality is these are people who 
have to come back into their communities.  There is not a 
manufacturing company in Southeast D.C., on the west side 
of Chicago, and they have to be prepared to deal with the 
reality of their life.  And that is not a discussion that 
we like to have, but it is something that is very real.  It 
is something that the NAACP as an organization deals with 
everyday. 
 
Just a quick question.  How many of you in here have had 
direct family members or someone close to you who have been 
through a federal or a state prison system.  Just raise 
your hand.  Okay.  I have to raise my hand too.  And it 
does make a difference, it really does, as to how you 
address the reality of what is going on in society. 
Privatization, and I am not trying to change the subject at 
all, but privatization of prisons is very critical, and 
labor force. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  I think you raise very good points, and 
therefore I would like to respond to it.  I did talk with 
prisoners and inmates and read their materials.  I had 
letters from them.  My daughter, who wrote her dissertation 
on this, interviewed a large number of them and she 
actually worked in the Massachusetts prison system while 
she was there. 
 
In the kind of work I do, you would never think about 
designing an intervention or a program without bringing the 
people to the table who are affected by it.  That is the 
reason I believe in this kind of representative democracy, 
the most effective things are the people who have programs, 
have the problems that bring them to the table. 
And I think there are some good writings by inmates.  One 
that I read in connection with my paper is called, ​The 
Celling of America, ​written entirely by inmates.  And they 
bring a perspective that nobody else has.  I think if you 
are going to try to design a program, you don't design it 
entirely from their perspective, because their perspective 
is narrow and out of focus.  They have inadequate 
information. 
 
Another advantage of the kind of negotiation process is 
that everybody comes away with better information than when 
they went into it.  In fact, as a mediator, I have two 
rules that I always use to start with.  The first rule, 
nobody recommends anything until we agree on the facts. 
And frequently, if you can get agreement on the facts, you 
narrow the range of the conflict. 
 
The other good rule of mediation is no blame casting.  I 
don't care why you got the way you are.  Let's agree that 
there is enough blame to go around, that we are all part of 
a system that has not served us well, and what we ought to 
be here to talk about is what do we do to fix it and to 
move forward.  And as a mediator, if you can do those 
things, you can usually get the parties moving in the right 
direction.  But I think you are absolutely right about that 
who is at the table, and to bring that perspective to 
balance it with other perspectives.  
 
 
MR. ROSENTHAL:  Well, we are talking about such a small 
part of the population.  I think that is basically what 
everybody has pointed out, that the numbers of people in 
prison, when you deal with the total number of people in 
the economy, is really very, very small.  And I think this 
issue is no different than every other issue that is based 
in the economy.  It is just part of the whole. 
 
MS. HAITHCOX:  Just a follow up.  People of color are not a 
small part of the economy.  And by far, the inmate 
population is certainly, there is a disparity in the inmate 
population in people of color and the economy and the labor 
force.  So we can't pretend like the numbers are so great 
 
and our numbers are so insignificant that we don't need to 
talk about this in real world numbers. 
 
MR. PRIMUS:  For 13 years I had the privilege of working 
for Dan Rostenkowski, the chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee.  And one of the comments I will never forget 
that he said after being incarcerated for about a year, he 
said we are letting these young black men rot in jail. 
Meaning we were doing very little to help them become 
rehabilitated and move into our society. 
 
The perspective that I am bringing to this conversation 
today is we think we have estimates that about 1.5 million 
children have one of their parents in jail.  And the thing 
that I have been doing a lot of work in the past year is 
thinking about how to increase the level of earnings of 
non-custodial parents in general, their involvement with 
the child support enforcement program, and how to help 
those kinds of parents meet their parental 
responsibilities.  
I also am told there is research that says that a prisoner 
who has a close connection to family and gets a job quickly 
after leaving the prison is less likely to return.  Those 
are two very important factors. 
 
Having said that, the two questions I have, of 
 
this wage, the minimum wage, how would that be divided as a 
policy matter, between the prisoner, his children on the 
outside, the victims, maybe, of the crime, and room and 
board?  How would you determine that policy?  I also 
believe we are a little unrealistic, because we expect 
welfare mothers to work, that work shouldn't be compulsory 
here.  It can't just be voluntary, at least from a 
political matter.  
 
The second question is how much of our efforts in this 
contract that you want to write should be geared toward 
building the skills, et cetera, of the prisoner, versus a 
make-work kind of pay situation?  How would you write the 
contract that strikes the appropriate balance, trade off, 
between those two objectives? 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  If I were writing these contracts, I would 
say to the person of the group, be it a private or 
governmental group, you are going to be paid in part by how 
well these prisoners are reintegrated into society, 
recidivism, their employment because I don't think you can 
micro-manage this. And certainly economists can't.  As one 
of us said, we are very abstract stuff.  I had trouble 
putting that [projector] button on, and somebody had to 
tell me to push the yellow thing or the red thing.  But I 
think the contract would have to be that you are putting on 
to the providers of "the prison services" that they will be 
paid and there will be more profits for that group, 
whatever the group was - it could be state or federal or 
private - on the basis of the outcomes.  And the outcome 
that we want is that these people, in larger numbers, 
reintegrate in their communities, get jobs and don't 
recidivate. 
 
I wouldn't dare think of how we can cut up the, say, $6 an 
hour.  I think that's, we could do experiments, in a sense 
we could try different ones.  Prisoners have to be 
motivated.  You want to give money back to the families, 
obviously, and the taxpayers have got to get their cut from 
the lower charge so it is less expensive to house them. 
But I would let that be determined empirically. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  Let me make a couple comments.  One, one of 
the things economists do and have demonstrated, is that 
reward systems matter, and that you get what you reward. 
And that is ordinarily what you would measure.  I used to 
say to my pupils, if you don't want it, don't measure it, 
because that is what we are going to reward.  And it is not 
hard to establish kind of general principles that you would 
create opportunity structures for inmates, for the prisons, 
with the reward system. 
 
Our problem now is that we get what we reward, and what we 
reward is incarceration and a continuation of the 
 
system.  We don't reward rehabilitation, reintegration into 
society, or any of those things that we say.  
 
In my school reform work I have found that you get no 
brownie points for student learning.  You are rewarded for 
average daily attendance, not student learning.  And 
therefore, in fact, you get a perverse incentive.  The more 
the students learn, the less you get because the quicker 
they get through.  And therefore, a perverse reward system 
is heavily built into all of our systems, including the 
criminal justice system. 
 
One of the first things I would do would be to look for the 
present rewards, the implicit rewards, and see what you are 
getting for that, and how that perpetuates the system and 
think if we can conceive of a different set of rewards. 
One reward that seems to be fairly clear is that if you 
can't get a job, you go into crime.  Well, that is an 
incentive structure.  That is a reward system.  So if we 
don't reward people for working, then we shouldn't be 
surprised that they then get into crime. 
 
Now, with respect to the voluntary, you raise a very 
serious point here.  Because if this labor is not 
voluntary, it would be in violation of international law 
for us to let those goods to be sold in the open market. 
It violates ILO Convention 105.  And, in fact, the AFL CIO 
has 
 
lodged a complaint with -- I think they have lodged it, 
they said they were going to -- with ILO that the same, 
that is the charge we are making against China.  That is a 
fairly well established principle in U.S. trade law, is 
that you cannot import things in the United States made 
with forced labor.  That was even in the so-called 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.  Which is the way we kept a lot of 
stuff out of South Africa until they changed their laws to 
do away with forced labor.  The contract that the South 
African Mine Company signed with their workers was a civil 
contract with a criminal penalty.  And we said until you 
change that law, none of the stuff produced in South 
African mines would come into the United States.  That 
caused them to change it faster than prayer did or wishful 
thinking.  And they called a special session and changed 
their law.  So I think that we have to pay pretty close 
attention to this question of whether it really is 
voluntary or not.  And if it is not going to be voluntary, 
then we have got a serious problem with working in the open 
markets. 
 
MR. LEVITT:  Just one comment with respect to the 
compulsory versus voluntary.  I think what I would envision 
is there are educational programs.  There is prison work, 
it is not labor, mopping the floor, things like that.  And 
then there is the prison industry.  And one of the ways in 
which 
 
to make it voluntary in the sense of the welfare mother 
parallel, is that they are not forced to work, they just 
don't get welfare anymore if they don't work. 
So if there is a higher wage for working within the prison, 
in the industry sector than, say, in the educational 
sector, now that might be the wrong way.  We might want it 
just the opposite.  We might want to pay higher wages to 
the skill development.  But it is a way to make it 
voluntary and yet, perhaps, politically acceptable, just to 
give a menu of choices. 
 
MR. PRIMUS:  I appreciate Ray Marshall's comment about the 
voluntary-involuntary.  I still have some difficulties that 
if this dad, typically, has a child support order and he 
refuses to follow through on that obligation and were 
making the mother who is, let's say, on the outside 
basically work, that seems to me a bit inequitable.  And I 
guess I would argue that most of you have ducked the 
question, I mean, at some point we do have to really 
decide.  Yes, I would like to run experiments, too, to see 
which would reward the prisoner more.  Obviously, if we 
gave most of it to him, that would be the most reward.  But 
he also has obligations. And the question is how do you 
really balance that.  So I think that you have argued, you 
ducked the question. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  Well, say we can probably do it better than 
we do it now.  We do it now, don't we, by fiat, you know, 
by somebody decides.  But you don't do any kind of bringing 
all the people to the table to make the decision. 
 
MR. PRIMUS:  I guess the question is how is that being 
decided.  Because the prison officials maybe care about the 
room and the board, and you have got other institutions 
that care about the family and the child support.  I mean, 
are all of those, when that decision is made, are they all 
at the table with an equal voice in terms of how we are 
going to do this? 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  I don't think so.  And that is the reason I 
say I think we can do better than we do.  We are doing it 
now, aren't we?  You do make the adoptions.  I don't know 
enough about it, but I do know enough about how these 
things work, is that, and I would find that out before 
 
I became serious about a policy proposal.  You need to take 
all of these things into consideration.  The question I 
would raise is not whether you do it, but can you improve 
on the way you are doing it now. 
 
MR. SCHWALB:  Thank you.  My name is Steve Schwalb.  I am 
the chief operating officer, Federal Prison Industries. 
And let me, first of all, commend all of the speakers this 
morning.  I want to, at least on my slant and perspective, 
and perhaps some of my colleagues in the prison industries 
work in the audience, dispel one myth some of you may be 
laboring under, and that is that somehow any or all of your 
suggestions, with perhaps the suggestion of unionizing 
inmates, that any of the rest of those are necessarily 
threatening or problematic or that there is resistance on 
our part to those ideas.  We are very intrigued by those, 
and I think they all make a lot of sense and have a lot of 
merit. 
 
The overriding consideration from prison 
administrators and prison industry managers' perspective is 
to have sufficient work opportunities to not have rampant 
inmate idleness on your hands, because we all know often 
the outcomes of idleness.  So we are not particularly 
focused, speaking especially for federal prison industries, 
on what type of product, what type of wage, what type of 
market -- 
 
all things are on the table as far as we are concerned, as 
long as it is not just all theory and we have idleness on 
our hands because none of it works. 
 
I was particularly intrigued by Professor Freeman's 
suggestion.  I would like to hear the reaction of the other 
economists, especially since he covered it, about the idea 
of having inmates focus their work opportunities on 
import-competing commodities.  And that is an idea that has 
intrigued us for some time.  Obviously it would take a 
change of authority and statute. 
 
The question is, is there or should there be viewed as the 
difference on the impact on the domestic economy of the 
United States between inmates producing products with low 
wages and imported products being made by people in foreign 
countries at low wages and imported?  And I ask that 
question sort of in two parts.  One is how do we segregate 
out the work so that we properly identify that we are, in 
fact, competing with imports?  
 
Secondly, even if we don't, since there are domestic 
companies that are competing with imports today, low wage 
imports, why is it economically attractive from a broad 
trade perspective to encourage that and it is so important 
to have inmate labor engaged in the same thing, in many 
cases, as some of you suggested, wages that are even 
higher, frankly than are paid in civilian labor rates in 
foreign countries?  
 
MR. KRUEGER:  Let me make an initial response to that.  I 
told Richard before, I liked his suggestion.  The way I 
interpret it is he wants to focus on industries that are, 
in economic jargon, outside the “Cone of Diversification.” 
And what that means is that industries in the U.S. no 
longer produce it because our general level of productivity 
or wages or endowments have brought us to a point where it 
is more efficient for us to import in those industries. 
For example, we no longer make TVS, or very few TVS in the 
United States.  If you choose an industry which is outside 
the cone of diversification -- sounds like something on 
“Get Smart” -- if you choose an industry where the U.S. is 
no longer in that business, then as Richard said, the 
inmate labor is not competing with domestic labor and we 
don't have these negative implications that we are 
concerned about.  The difficulty is, as a practical 
standpoint, is much trade takes place within industries, 
both imports and exports.  It is a major puzzle in the 
field of international trade why so much intra-industry 
trade takes place. 
 
You can't just look at an industry and say we only import 
there, so we will focus on that.  And as you pointed 
 
out, if you choose an industry where we have both imports 
and exports, then I think it has very little difference 
than choosing an industry where we are by and large 
producing domestically in terms of the ramifications for 
the rest of the private sector.  I also think that in the 
long run, there would be a lot of pressure to try to expand 
this set of industries, to bring it back within the cone of 
diversification, industries where we are producing.  So I 
think that is a perfectly sensible principle.  I don't know 
how far it takes us in practice. 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  I am a little less dubious on how practical 
it could be because part of this industry thing is the 
definition of industries in our data.  And think of an 
industry that is 90% imports at this point, shoes.  There 
are 10% American shoe people there.  But if we quickly can 
tell you that they still make Texas boots in Texas, and I 
can name the American shoe companies still around and the 
kinds of shoes that they would make in this country.  And 
the vast bulk of the inexpensive, not immediately 
fashionable shoes are made in Romania, China, a whole set 
of countries actually that do it.  And that is what you 
would do, in that these are the sets of products outside 
this cone of diversification.  We couldn't even imagine the 
American industry being able to go simply because our 
workers are so much more skilled and their wages are so 
much higher that barring a breakdown of international 
trade, will never go back to a certain set of industries. 
 
One worries a little bit, apparel.  But there, also, where 
the Americans are producing things, it is in niche parts of 
the markets.  This cone of diversification - Alan is 
absolutely right - given any definition of industries, we 
will find some American producers, and so there is a 
problem.  But then if you look a little more deeply, and 
the reason I picked the Chinese, the largely Chinese-made 
now, these little plastic toys, I know any, if you do, 
raise your hand.  Has anybody picked up a little plastic 
toy and seen it say “Made in USA”?  A couple of years ago 
it was made in Taiwan.  But the Chinese have a complete 
market on that type of thing.  I can't imagine that ever 
coming back to the U.S. 
So I think we could, indeed, find products.  The question, 
obviously, is could prison-made goods in the U.S. in these 
areas compete with the foreign products, and that would 
have to be looked at case by case.  And some business-type 
people are going to have to make some judgments that we 
hope would be correct.  But there are a lot of products 
there.  We are running such a huge trade deficit at this 
point, there are many, many products that are outside this 
cone of diversification. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  One other follow up point I was thinking as 
Richard was describing this.  One of the main reasons for 
trying to encourage prison labor is to reintegrate people 
into the community when they leave.  And to the extent 
there are some specific skills that they learn while they 
are in prison, it would be very difficult if they take a 
job which is only available in China outside of the 
prisons.  So I think that is another cost of this. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  It seems to me that if you did 
these other things, I will make two observations to your 
comments.  One is I don't conceive anything that I have 
recommended as necessarily threatening to prison industry 
system.  I can see where the prison industry system 
threatens the prisons and the culture of the institution 
itself.  And since I applaud that, I think that it would do 
the prisons a lot of good to have them subjected to a 
different set of rewards and a different set of 
institutional response.  But if you do the things to 
balance the competition, you shouldn't really be concerned 
that much about what the effects are going to be because 
you minimize the adverse effects that you could likely have 
on the society. 
 
But part of the thing that would have to be done then is to 
take the industries that would have the least effect.  And 
that way, I think, and it is a strategic activity where you 
are talking about change.  The best rule I have ever found 
is organize your friends and disperse your enemies.  And in 
picking industries, it would be useful to do that.  Don't 
concentrate them in places where you know you are going to 
organize a lot of opposition to it. 
 
MS. SMITH:  Good morning.  First, I thought that I was 
going to have to use Steve Levitt's anecdote because I was 
so far down the line and I was trying to think of a 
substitute for Sophia Lauren.  One of the things is that 
this has been very interesting.  And I really applaud the 
efforts of all of the presenters.  And this is not 
generally sort of the dialogue that I hear.  I am a 
professor at American University and I teach in the Civil 
Practice Clinic.  Prior to that, I was a litigator and I 
sued prisons.  And primarily what I sued prisons about was 
about discrimination against women.  One of the things that 
I would note is that in the analysis that has been 
presented, the conversations have been primarily about men. 
There has been very little analysis at all about women. 
And I think that when we talk about the structural 
impediments in the prison system, and also the structural 
impediments in our community in our world at large, one of 
the big ones is sex discrimination.  For all of you who 
have gone in prisons, I am sure you have gone in prison 
industries and seen women, probably not in federal systems 
as much, but women making underwear and boxer shorts while 
men are making cabinets, doing metalworking.  And so what I 
would like you to do is take that as a context and talk 
about whether there is any difference in the social 
benefits or social costs for women inmates as opposed to 
men. 
The other thing we also need to mention is that there is an 
impact, I mean, we know that the numbers of women are 
increasing.  We seem to talk about this as a very small 
population.  But when you think about, again in terms of 
the social cost and the people who are impacted, you are 
not talking about just those women.  You are also talking 
about children and their families. 
 
Another interesting statistic is that when women are 
incarcerated, their children, about 76% of them, are cared 
for by their family members, by their mothers.  When men 
are incarcerated, about 89% of their children are cared 
 
for by the mothers of those children.  So there is a 
tremendous social cost on families that are taking care of 
those kids and also on single female-headed households who 
are sort of bearing the brunt of the absence of those 
prisoners, whether they are male or female, from the 
community.  And so I would like you to talk about that. 
 
And then finally, I was so glad that Wendell raised that 
question about how do you split the pie.  On Wednesday, I 
was at the Eastern Regional Conference on Enforcement of 
Child Support.  And I was doing a panel on collecting child 
support from jailed parents.  And one of the things that I 
think is very important here is that we be very clear that 
as soon as it becomes clear that this is a source of money, 
that there are going to be all kinds of people lining up. 
It is not just room and board.  It is medical expenses, it 
is clothing, it is child support, it is victims services. 
And so in doing that, in having those people lined up, one 
of the basic assumptions that you have made is that 
improvement in the system is really going to be about 
improvement in morale. 
 
People work in order to learn things, to have those 
relationships that you get from jobs.  But I work for 
money. And that is what most people work for.  And so if 
you have a system where of the $300 they make they may get 
5, aren't you really creating, in some ways, almost a 
system of peonage where there really is no incentive for 
people to work? 
 
MR. LEVITT:  I will take the first question with respect to 
women and men.  I think given our charge and given that we 
are economists, what we did was abstract from the 90% of 
the prison population that is men and we kind of threw out 
the 10% that is women.  And we did all of that 
independently.  But let me talk about it now, let me 
revisit that. 
One key point is that the crimes that women and men are in 
prison for tend to be different.  I don't know the exact 
numbers, but the number of violent offenders among women is 
much lower, proportionately, than men.  The number of 
drug-related offenses is much higher for women than men. 
Also taking that point about the fact that child care is 
done primarily by women and by the women's family when they 
are in prison.  
 
The way I would interpret this is to say there is a lot 
better reason for having men in prison than women because 
the social costs associated with violent crime are most 
likely much higher than those related to drug-related 
crime. And so in the broader perspective, I would say we 
maybe should reallocate the prison population to stress 
more violent offenders, and that would help the side effect 
of having fewer women inmates. 
 
Now, from the perspective of the social benefits of work, I 
think the opposite is true, that in fact the social 
benefits of prison industry would be greater for men than 
for women, that there is more to be gained by having men 
not recidivate than women not recidivate.  And so it is 
because men are the worst criminals and men are the ones 
that aren't supporting their children, that we actually 
wanted to give them the bigger boost, then we could take it 
away and give it to the women who are not incarcerated. 
So, and it is probably not the answer you want to hear, but 
I think that is, sort of, that is what the economics 
suggest. 
 
Now, in terms of splitting the pie, again, talking as an 
economist, it is just not an economic issue.  Splitting the 
pie is somewhat an economic issue just because of 
incentives.  But really it is a political issue.  There is 
a fixed amount of money out there and you want to split it 
and there are a lot of people who want to get their hands 
on it. And I don't think that is something that economists 
necessarily have a lot of intelligence to provide guidance 
on. 
 
MR. KLING:  I will say one other thing about the benefits 
that might accrue to women, which is that it is really true 
that there are fewer crimes being committed by people who 
have participated in inmate labor programs, that the 
victims of those crimes will tend to be women as well as 
men.  And so there is the potential for them to reach some 
of those kinds of benefits as well, if that in fact turns 
out to be true.  But that is, as I tried to indicate 
earlier, something about which we have a shred of 
suggestive evidence but really need to know a lot more 
about in order to base policy on something like that. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  I just wanted to say two quick points.  One 
is that the social cost for encouraging more women inmate 
laborers to work is smaller in that if you look at the 
spillover effects on the private sector, women tend to be 
in different occupations and industries in the private 
sector than men.  They are a much smaller proportion of 
that workforce.  So I think some of the social consequences 
that we talked about earlier, about depressing wages for 
less skilled workers would also be smaller. 
Then the other point which Richard Freemanwhispered in my 
ear, and Wendell Primus is probably more familiar with this 
literature than I am, many of the interventions that have 
been tried for low income populations, job training and so 
 
forth, seem to be more effective for less skilled women. 
So for that reason, I wouldn't be surprised if programs 
such as work while in prison or training more generally 
have higher payoffs for women than they do for men. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  But this also indicates that they know more 
about subjects.  That is, in doing my quick search for this 
I found very little on women and differentiating.  So it is 
clear to me that this is an area that if you really work on 
trying to design an effective program, you would need to 
know a lot more about it.  And we could probably do 
comparative work, see what they do in other countries.  Or 
in some states, I notice, you have much higher rate of 
incarceration of women than others.  Why?  It would be 
useful to pursue that and see what they do. 
 
Moderator, MS. KASLOW:  Most of the answers overlap with 
your second question, but if you want to re-ask it, perhaps 
a bit more focused, you will get a more focused answer. 
And then reiterate your third, because I think we have all 
forgotten it. 
 
MS. SMITH:  Right.  I guess one of the things that I would 
like to do just in terms of clarifying a couple of things 
is that while women are definitely in, there are smaller 
numbers of women who are in for violent offenses.  We know 
that women are primarily in for economic offenses, drugs, 
passing bad checks.  And so it seems to me that your 
 
point that the benefits to them of increasing inmate labor 
will be probably higher.  I think that that is also true 
given that women are slightly better educated, have less 
behavioral problems in a prison system, and so would have 
probably a quicker learning curve. 
One of the things that I think we have to be clear about is 
that while we might want to re-engineer the system and sort 
of redistribute the prison population because it really is 
of less social value -- and I say this because I am talking 
in this context -- to have women incarcerated than men, 
even though I argue that most of the people who are 
incarcerated, there is not much social cost in having them 
there because they are primarily drug offenders, that there 
really isn't a distinction in reality for women as opposed 
to men.  And I think that there are also some very clear 
things that happen to women as opposed to men in a public 
policy context that I hope that the economists would take a 
look at. 
So for example, when you have in the welfare reform bill 
that people who are convicted of felony drug offenses are 
not eligible for public benefits, this has a much greater 
impact on women than it does on men.  The ban on these 
inmates getting into public housing if they have a drug 
offense also will have a greater impact on women than men 
because they are primarily drug offenders and they are 
 
primarily the people who have care for children. 
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  My name is Charlie Sullivan and I direct 
CURE, Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants.  And 
in fact, as Mr. Marshall knows, we met with you before we 
expanded to a national organization.  I guess it has been 
close to 15 years ago.  We started in Texas and we always 
say if we can survive prison reform in Texas we can survive 
it anywhere.  So we do have an organization of about 12,000 
members, most of them all prisoners and their families.  We 
have, I think, state chapters presence in most states. 
 
I would like, if I could, mention people that are missing 
at the table.  And one person who has been my teacher in 
this issue for many years is not here and I would just like 
to share with you who he is and encourage you to visit his 
factories, his inmate work factories in Kansas City. 
Fred Braun is a wonderful guy.  He is also a Republican, 
and I guess I consider myself a liberal, radical I guess, 
Democrat.  But it is a bipartisan issue.  I think there are 
many people here from all political persuasions.  And I 
think that is very important.  We don't have a lot of 
issues that both the Republicans and Democrats can get on 
board on. But it has been my experience that it seems to be 
very, very bipartisan.  Fred Braun went to the governor of 
Kansas and asked what he could do, and the governor, 25 
years ago, even before the beginning of PIE programs by the 
Justice Department, suggested to Fred that he go into the 
prisons and train prisoners.  So he has been doing this for 
over 25 years.  So, in fact, he always says to me, and this 
is something I think is a great line that you want to use 
when you talk to middle America, the Kiwanis or whatever, 
if you really want to punish these guys, and women too, 
make them taxpayers.  And I think that is very important to 
hammer away at. 
 
Let me say, too, that he also, in his factories, he has the 
ESOP program, which I think is great.  And we have the 
expert here, Norm Kurland, who is the expert from the 
council, for Mr. Kelso, worked for him many years and could 
tell us about it where prisoners actually, and also we are 
talking about united whatever, but Norm could tell you 
about this at break or whatever, but employees actually own 
shares in the company, and that is happening out in his 
factories. 
Fred Braun also has started something for which I serve on 
his board, it is called the Workmen's Fund, where he will 
give to small businesses up to $50,000 to go into the 
prisons.  And so he has really been someone who is not only 
an activist but also has a vision.  And let me say the 
final point -- which I think Congressman Scott's aide is 
here, Bobby Vassar, we had quite a discussion at the break 
that this issue of minimum wage or prevailing wage is 
really a bogus issue -- but Fred Braun feels very strongly 
that the minimum wage is the only thing that is going to 
get businesses to go into prisons.  And basically I think 
he is saying that by seeking the prevailing wage was 
killing the good by seeking the perfect.  
 
I realize you are looking at the economic side of this, but 
the victim impact has really been minimized in today's 
presentations.  And I am talking about not only the impact 
to victims of violent crimes, but the impact to non-violent 
crimes.  I think it is very, very important.  And anyone 
who has ever had their house broken into or their car or 
whatever, you never forget it.  And I don't think that has 
been measured today. 
 
And the good side, the benefits of being able to turn a 
prisoner around and not have that in the future, I think it 
is just incredible to be able to, you just can't document 
that.  And also, at the same time, I don't think you can 
document the rehab role models to prisoners, individuals. 
 
Don Taylor was the first chair of our organization and he 
was chairing, he was in eight jails before the age of 14. 
He went down to the Texas Department of Corrections three 
times for drug offenses.  When he died two years ago, he 
was chairing a national advisory committee to legislators. 
And he did it by going to the LBJ School of Public Affairs, 
got his Masters Degree in Public Affairs.  And I have been 
encouraging the head of the prison system in Texas to name 
a program after Don.  I think we need role models.  We 
don't, you know, in Texas, of course they are building so 
many prisons, but they have got to name the ex-governor. 
Why don't we name it after a successful prisoner, a 
program, education.  And the way Don did it was through 
education.  And we ought to begin to realize that we are 
looking at this 2 million prison force and we need to, they 
are looking for role models, people that have made it.  And 
so I don't think that has been mentioned today. 
 
And let me get to my question.  My question is education, 
which Don was involved very much in.  That is how he got 
himself out of this hole.  He dug himself out through 
education.  And I just feel, I just heard and read ​The 
Lexus and the Olive Tree​, which is on the best seller list​. 
I just encourage you to read this book and anybody that 
reads this book and realizes the importance of how things 
 
have changed since 1989, that we are in a new era. 
I just do not see how a prisoner today can be educated 
without access to computers.  I just feel very strongly. 
And I realize there can be abuses.  And I know, for 
example, Steve Schwalb, you probably have had to worry 
about computers, et cetera, but there has got to be, I 
think Congressman Cleo Fields ran in Louisiana for governor 
on a computer in every prison cell.  Now, that is what we 
have got to, and that is going to be a very important issue 
in all of this because of the security problems.  But I 
still think that they can be taken care of and still 
prisoners can have access to computers. 
 
Also, when they get out, I think besides being able to have 
a good job, there is also a move to provide voting rights 
for them, which Congressman Conyers had introduced.  I 
think that is extremely important.  And also there has been 
a little bit of a move toward doing something about 
restrictions.  Of all things the federal government now has 
an optional form whereby you can go in and you do not have 
to put your criminal background there.  That will get you 
into the interview so that that person who is interviewing 
and sees you is not prejudiced that says this is an ex-con, 
I am not going hire him, an ex-felon or whatever.  They are 
going to check, certainly.  They are going to get to the 
criminal justice system and access it, but you know that we 
now have community notification with regard to sex 
offenders, et cetera.  So there are a lot of things that I 
think we can begin to move away, to remove restrictions 
with regard to employment.  And the federal government in 
this particular incident by having this optional form where 
you don't have to put your criminal background down is a 
first step. 
 
So the question I am getting to is this.  How in this day 
and age is it essential, in your opinion, that prisoners 
are able to have access to computers, looking at the 
economy, where we are going, et cetera? 
 
(Moderator) MS. KASLOW:  Why don't we broaden that question 
a bit because you raised so many interesting issues.  
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, let me make a further issue.  We just 
eliminated Pell grants for prisoners in 1994. I mentioned 
to my wife who is here.  She said she thought there was too 
much emphasis on low-skilled workers.  They are low-skilled 
because they don't have access to education.  So what I am 
saying is in regard to the education part of this, the 
other side of the same coin with work, what is the role of 
education in the privatization of prison? 
 
MR MARSHALL:  Well, I think the role of education is very 
important.  And I don't think we ought to concentrate on 
low-skilled jobs at all.  I think we ought to concentrate 
on improving the skills of the workers.  And it is very 
clear to me from my work in education, particularly the Job 
Corps, for example, which had developed a very effective 
education system using computers and using teaching 
machines, that we can move people, if we do it right, if it 
is based on what we know about how people learn, much 
faster than we do in ordinary schools.  This is a 
non-traditional learning process, and I would give maximum 
attention to that in prisons.  But I think that time that 
you spend taking people as far as they can go in whatever 
time they have got, and you can, with an efficient learning 
process. 
 
The other experience that we have had with this is that the 
immediate barrier that you have to overcome in educating 
people from low wage and low education backgrounds is to 
convince them that they can, in fact, learn anything and 
learn it in a hurry because most of these folks have been 
programmed for failure from birth and don't believe they 
can learn.  So in all these, all of our activities, the 
first thing that we do is to illustrate the principle that 
any person can learn and that the only way you can cause 
them to really believe that is to show them. 
 
Now, I don't know if you know.  We have got an experimental 
program in Ft. O'Connor, Texas using these techniques about 
what we learn.  It is teaching algebra and geometry to the 
Kindergarten and 1st Graders.  They are one-third poor 
White, one-third poor Black, one-third poor Hispanic, and 
they are doing very well.  I had a Ph.D. mathematician come 
to work with me, said he didn't believe that they could do 
that.  I said, “Well, be scientific.  Go see.  And I will 
tell them you are going to show up one day, you pick your 
day.”  And he went into a room, a little five-year old 
Black girl was working away at something.  He said, What 
are you doing?”  She said, “Well, today I am multiplying 
fractions.” He said, “You can't multiply fractions.”  And 
she grabbed her pencil and squinted her eyes and said, 
“Give me some.” 
Well, you see, that is a hump that you have to overcome 
with many of these.  It is what my daughter found out in 
the Massachusetts prison system, and in the Texas prison 
system. Once you show them that they can, in fact, learn, 
and we learned that in the Job Corps, then you have to 
drive them out of the rooms at midnight, you know, because 
they get so excited about the fact that they really can do 
it.  And we ought to take the best of what we know about 
the learning technology and put it into the prisons. 
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  The only thing I would say is that I don't 
think that computers, I think computers, if there are any 
in prisons right now, they are very few and they are being 
eliminated every day.  And they could be, like you say, 
self-education, where you could go into the night, teaching 
yourself, et cetera.  And I think we have got to be able to 
keep those computers in. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  Yes.  And what you have to do, though, with 
any technology, is to have a good theory of it, what is it 
for and what is your use of it.  And if you go in with the 
wrong theory, you do the wrong thing.  The typical 
assumption is that the purpose of the technology is to 
replace people.  If that is your theory, you lose.  If your 
theory is that the use of the technology is to extend human 
capabilities, you will win, because that is what it is 
exactly designed to do, or that is the most effective use 
of it.  And so it is not just the computer, that is the 
point I would make.  We found in the Job Corps case, I 
think about 95% of the kids, the youngsters in the Job 
Corps took to the machine learning in a hurry.  And it was 
so different.  See, the machines are self-paced, 
non-judgmental, and color blind.  And in our learning 
systems, all of those things are barriers to learning, is 
you get judgmental learning.  And I can see where a lot 
that we have learned about the use of the technology in 
learning and the use of learning processes could be 
applied, and I would be surprised if it weren't.  I think 
probably, if you did a proper study, you would find some of 
the most progressive prison systems already doing some of 
these things.  Here or in some other countries. 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  Many of the prisoners get their GEDs.  That 
is obviously a big thing.  There is a certain amount of 
education going on.  And the numbers that Alan and Jeff put 
up, it was very implicit.  They said high school degrees 
and GEDs.  And the typical non-prisoner got theirs through 
a high school degree.  I don't know what the prisoner break 
is, but it is going to be very many people getting their 
GEDs. 
 
There is a problem you raise with the computer, which is 
generalized from computers.  Because gee, if you said to me 
a computer in every prison cell, I would say wait a minute, 
we haven't got a computer on every school desk.  And I 
think there is an issue of the prison thing, I do not think 
we want generally to provide certain things to prisoners 
that we are not providing equally to equally low-skilled, 
disadvantaged people outside who decided even though they 
didn't get high wages and didn't have a good opportunity 
they weren't going to commit crimes.  So I think that that 
cuts on other issues as well. 
 
My personal view would be computers are real cheap nowadays 
and that we would like to see computers everyplace.  It 
would make Bill Gates happier, and we all know, he is a 
Harvard dropout, proof that you don't have to get too much 
education to be a success.  But maybe there can be some 
general discussion of this issue of if you are going to 
provide something for the people in prison that is better 
than, we have got to make sure that the poor people outside 
have the same opportunities, et cetera.  Otherwise, we set 
up a funny system. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  Let me comment a little bit on computers. 
Most of what I do for a living is study the way computers 
impact the labor market.  Over half of all jobs now require 
some knowledge of computer use.  Harry Holzer did a study 
in inner cities where he found that what employers are 
looking for by and large or in large part is people who 
have computer skills, not just executives, but all the way 
down the line.  So I think it is quite an important skill. 
I don't know if I would say it is essential to get a job, 
but it certainly helps. 
 
There is a program that a Princeton alum -- the Detweiler 
Foundation -- started to take obsolete computers, spiff 
them up, make them faster, and then give them to schools. 
It is primarily done in California.  But one of the things 
they do is to have inmates do some of the work on the 
computers, changing the hard drives and so forth.  A 
program like that, expanding it, where the inmates also 
learn how to repair computers, which is a job that is in 
demand, as well as have the benefit of the formerly 
obsolete computers I think is potentially very attractive. 
It also is different than what you have outside.  It is not 
better.  You have more obsolete equipment. 
 
(Moderator) MS. KASLOW:  Just that one more general 
question, was you raised so many issues about preparing 
would-be workers for the workforce eventually, and 
computers being, obviously, one tool, but one of many 
tools.  What, in the economists' views, how far should we 
be going from public expenditure, private sector 
investment, various businesses taking this on, who should 
be supplying the wherewithal for inmates to prepare, to 
beef up their workforce preparedness?  I mean, are we 
talking about donations of technology, are we talking about 
donations of time, expertise, mentoring, apprenticeships? 
We have heard a lot of things mentioned today.  The Job 
Corps example is a splendid one.  What are the nuts and 
bolts of this in terms of, what do you think?  It is an 
open question.  
 
MR. MARSHALL:  Well, I would say all of the above. 
Whatever.  And different industries will have different 
motives for making the equipment available.  We find that 
in most of our employment training programs now, that you 
have to use some combination of public funds to make this 
available to people. 
 
But I would say a good way to explore it, I don't know 
enough about it to know where this would come out, but 
those people who benefit most from prison industry ought to 
have some obligation to help reintegrate the ex-offenders 
 
into society, including training, education.  That might, 
if you were putting together this bid process, which I 
think has a lot of merit, you would put that down as one of 
the things that you were expected to do if you were going 
to be involved in this industry, to help give people the 
kinds of education and training they need to make it in 
society. 
 
MR. WOODHEAD:  Well, after all the speakers, I kind of feel 
like the eighth prospective husband, especially after 
Charlie's presentation, so many provocative ideas.  It is 
going to be difficult keeping it interesting.  My name is 
Greg Woodhead.  I work at the Department of Public Policy 
at the AFL CIO, and we try to fashion policy in the 
interest of working families in America.  We are the voice 
of working families and we are especially the voice of 
organized labor.  
We represent free labor.  We represent the service sector 
and manufacturing workers in the private sector, and we 
also represent the public sector workers who work in 
correctional industries, both at the federal level and at 
the state level.  We have AFGE and we have AFSME, very 
important representation.  And so we have to balance the 
interests of our federated union members to craft policy 
that is beneficial for our members and also beneficial for 
prisoners. 
 
One thing that we have come to find out from 
 
looking at this issue very carefully is that there is 
really no simple answer to this problem.  It is a complex 
problem. It is a difficult problem.  It does need more 
study.  I can suggest a few areas.  I think we need more 
longitudinal studies of the effects on employment and 
re-employment, not just on the effects of reducing 
recidivism, because I think in Ray Marshall's paper there 
was an interesting study from Ohio that indicated that the 
rates dropped among Black inmates released from 36% to 26%, 
but a good controlled study showed that the rates did not 
drop at all amongst White prisoners.  So I think more of 
these studies need to be done. 
 
I think we need to look more carefully at joint 
apprenticeship programs.  We have to look at the 
possibility of teaching entrepreneurship to prisoners.  Why 
should they only be relegated only to working on the 
outside for somebody else?  Teach them how to support 
themselves in the private sector.  This is where job 
creation is.  
And I think we need to study more carefully what is going 
on in the state prison industry programs that may, in fact, 
be selling goods across state lines in direct violation of 
federal law and not be enrolled or participating in an 
established PIE program. 
 
Having said all that, I think we have a task ahead of us to 
find out what is going on right now, and maybe craft some 
policies to work to the benefit of prisoners while 
protecting free labor and protecting the safety of 
correctional officers inside the prisons. 
I would commend you to Ray Marshall's paper.  When Ray 
Marshall says he doesn't really know that much about prison 
industry, it reminds me of Sam Irving, Senator Irving, 
saying he doesn't know that much, he is just a country 
lawyer.  I think Ray Marshall's paper really fairly 
characterizes free labor's position on this issue and he 
spells out what happened in the Iowa system, when, in fact, 
the issue of apprenticeship and placing released prisoners 
into private jobs was debated in union halls.  And those 
union members came to accept these graduates of apprentice 
programs, which are very highly valued amongst union 
members.  So it can be done.  And I think this is a program 
that should be expanded. 
 
The AFL CIO is, however, very concerned about the potential 
expansion of prison labor.  After all, we did lose 400,000 
manufacturing jobs in the United States in the last year 
alone.  In that context, that economic context, being a 
manufacturing worker and being asked to compete with 
expanding prison industries is not a good prospect.  At the 
same time, we always have to be concerned with guard 
safety, because we know that prison work is good and prison 
work provides for guard safety. 
 
I will make a couple of observations about the panelists' 
presentations.  At the macro-level, yes, the size of prison 
industries is not overwhelming relative to the size of the 
GDP.  But at the micro-level the dislocation can be 
devastating, especially if you can make a direct link, like 
a case in Wisconsin with fabric gloves where a private 
factory closed and a company ramped up production inside 
the prison walls.  So free labor was directly impacted. 
Those cases are not good, especially if you are in a rural 
area and your job prospects are not very good and you have 
seniority in manufacturing and the transition to whatever 
jobs are available is going to be very difficult. 
We have real problems with privatization of prisons.  The 
inability to organize those privately run prisons, the 
abuses, the potential abuse is well-documented in 
television programs.  That can be very problematic.  I am 
also concerned about just the notion of bidding out 
prisoners to private companies.  That just has a 
connotation to it that is just disturbing if you follow 
through with the implications of that. 
 
Prevailing wages can be paid to prisoners.  The PIE program 
shows that.  Maybe we have to have some imputed wage to 
level the playing field somewhere between prevailing wage 
and minimum wage.  But we can't just say that the minimum 




If any of you are interested in the latest position of the 
AFL CIO with regard to prison industries, I have those 
papers available if you give me a card sometime when we 
are, in the afternoon -- 
 
MS. KASLOW:  Greg, why don't you pose a question to the 
panel?  Do you have a question for the panel economists? 
 
MR. ROSENTHAL:  I think that Greg brought up something that 
maybe I can chastize my economist friends here.  Most of 
the models that they have been talking about in terms of 
prison work has been on manufacturing, manufacturing little 
things that are made in China, shoes, industries that are 
leaving the United States.  It has all been on 
manufacturing, which economists tend to do in terms of 
their economic models. 
A very small percent, or not a very small percent, but a 
smaller percent each year of our economy is associated with 
manufacturing.  And a large percent, as I showed in my 
numbers, is outside manufacturing.  Many of those jobs can 
be done, are done, off the work site, especially using 
computers.  There are a lot of things that can be done 
which don't focus on one industry. 
You get into one industry, it is the type of thing that 
Greg was bringing up, somebody is going to get upset, you 
are on my turf.  But if you can get some type of work that 
spreads around, that is in a lot of industries, you don't 
have that one focus getting in some type of work that can 
be done everywhere.  And I think maybe the welfare reform, 
the type of success of the program is something that deals 
with it.  It is low skill level jobs because of the 
educational background of the individuals, yet it is spread 
out into lots of different jobs all over the country and 
has been successful because they exist all over the country 
as you see in the numbers. 
 
And if that type of thing can be done, it has to be done 
off the work site, obviously, in many cases.  All of the 
jobs don't get there.  But computers is one.  It has the 
educational value.  50% of the workers or perhaps even  
more -- I would bet you 90% or more of the people in this 
room have a computer at their desk.  And that is, it gets 
into more and more different jobs.  It gets to the 
education 
 
for higher level jobs, and I think that is something we 
have to consider.  It is not just focusing on one industry, 
but on something that cuts across. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  I am just curious if the AFL-CIO had a 
position on what Ray Marshall called inmate councils or 
unions for inmates. 
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  Company unions are bad idea in any form. 
 
MR. KRUEGER:  I think Ray would agree. 
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  I think it would be better served to look 
very carefully at these joint apprenticeship programs, 
because we are very much interested in what happens to 
prisoners upon release.  And this is a real source of union 
membership and it is a real source of stable jobs, good 
paying jobs with benefits, union jobs.  So I like that 
idea, but I don't like the idea of company unions. 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  But I will remind you, a lot of unions 
started out as company unions.  That is another advantage 
of looking at the history.  Communications Workers used to 
be a company union.  Steel Workers used to be a company 
union.  And the first stage in the development of many 
unions was initially the workers had some way to represent 
their interest in the workplace.  Then they saw they needed 
an independent source of power.  And I think 
 
that is the natural history of it.  There is a natural 
history that it is hard to have a long range collaborative 
relationship between parties with unequal power.  So as 
soon as it works, so long as you didn't deal with any 
important issue with the company unions.  And as soon as 
they got to tough issues, like whether we have a wage cut, 
it fell apart and then they went and got steel workers or 
communications workers, they organized an independent 
union. 
 
MR. PRIMUS:  Can I make one more comment on a question? 
And that is back to my issue of child support.  I think, 
since I have probably prison officials in the room, one of 
the things that happens lots of times when these dads 
become incarcerated is that the child support order isn't 
changed. And so a year, two or three years after, when they 
get out, they have an arrearage of five, ten thousand 
dollars.  And then, I know of one situation in Colorado, 
they have that arrearage, they have their normal child 
support order, then they also have a payment to the 
victims, and so, and then they have the federal income tax, 
and they typically, because their children don't reside 
with them, don't get the EITC or any other kind of wage 
subsidy.  Their net wage, after leaving prison, assuming 
they get a job, is very, very small.  And I think we have 
got to be concerned about these different institutions 
being better coordinated. 
 
I have come to the conclusion again from this, my efforts 
on non-custodial parents, is that for many of the men 
coming out of prison, we may need a bridge job, a publicly 
funded job, to ease the transition, if you will, given that 
they have got a conviction, et cetera, into the paid labor 
force. I know, Secretary Marshall, you talked about 
publicly funded jobs in the late-80s.  What about that 
idea, again, to help bridge the transition into, and help 
them meet their parental responsibilities? 
 
MR. MARSHALL:  I believe that there is an important role to 
be played for publicly funded jobs.  In fact, a lot of jobs 
are publicly funded that are called private jobs, like the 
construction industry.  But I think the best approach is to 
have an array of policies available so that if you are 
unable to find bridge jobs in the private sector, then it 
might make some sense to have a public service job doing 
useful things. 
 
Our experience with the public service jobs actually has 
been pretty good, in spite of all of the rhetoric about it. 
Most of the evaluations showed that they did what they were 
supposed to do.  And I believe it is important to have the 
bridge process that would make it possible for people to 
get work. 
 
But the first preference would be to get private jobs, that 
is, to get a job that would lead somewhere.  And I think we 
ought to concentrate on that.  But then if you are unable 
to that, then I think the public job makes sense. 
 
MR. WOODHEAD:  We start down a slippery slope on that 
argument because there is unemployment now in the free 
world.  That means we are going to have prisoners employed. 
I mean, where does that stop?  Drug treatment, there is 
need for drug treatment in the free world.  That means 
prisoners don't qualify for drug treatment.  I think you 
start going down that line, you are going to end up with an 
idle workforce with all kinds of behavioral problems that 
we are not going to address because we are not addressing 
these in the free world. 
 
But if, like the data shows, if they come out, these 
particular individuals, and commit two violent offenses, 
and I think they said ten non-violent offenses, I think 
society in its self-interest ought to be focusing in on 
their problems, just from a self-interest.  I think the 
Pell grant argument, removing them, was used, that argument 
was a very, very strong argument and they took them out 
because of that. 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  Yes, I would, I mean, the Pell grants, any 
normal thing that society is offering to citizens you don't 
want to see removed.  The right to vote is a very 
interesting one because now they are back as citizens and 
you would like to give them the right to vote. You are back 
and you are part of the body politic and part of the 
nation.  
 
MR. WOODHEAD:  And that is, and getting back to 
international law, that is Article 25 of U.N. Declaration 
of Human Rights, says that there should be universal 
suffrage throughout the world.  And so, I mean, I think 
that issue, there are four states that do allow prisoners 
to vote. 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  Yes, but let me put your thinking another 
way. I can see all the economists here agreeing that if we 
gave them a $25,000 check in two years for not committing 
crimes, that that would pay off if they didn't commit 
crimes.  But now there is no way that would ever be 
approved in the country, and it would, you know, because 
there are other equally, no, more deserving folks, 
including the victims.  So there is a balancing act, I 
think, that has got to be done.  It has got to be done 
carefully and cautiously. 
 
I was thinking when you did the computer thing, 
telemarketing.  That could be done inside prisons, and is 
done in some prisons.  And that requires some, et cetera. 
We could do other computer jobs using the internet that 
prisoners could do that would not, the opposite of, you 
 
know, non-manufacturing.  There are all sorts of things. 
But I think they all have to be careful.  I have a friend 
that runs a telemarketing firm.  He might be upset if you 
tell him the local prisoners are going to be doing it 
unless we establish all the kinds of things that Steve had 
so that it becomes a fair competition and doesn't adversely 
effect the current people who are doing the telemarketing 
who also will tend to be low educated folk. 
 
MR. SULLIVAN:  But I think that argument, I disagree very 
much with that approach. 
 
MR. PETERSIK:  I am going to ask two really quick 
questions. The first one is just a clarifying question. 
When you all talk about participation in unions, do you 
mean, in a sense, company unions or unions of inmates, or 
were you primarily talking about being members of unions 
which also exist beyond the walls?  
 
MR. LEVITT:  I think I was thinking of unions beyond the 
walls. But I am open-minded about it. 
  
MR. MARSHALL:  Yes, I was, too.  And I would say that just 
as there are degrees of representation of workers now, the 
workers at Saturn have much different kinds of powers than 
the workers in a regular General Motors plant, and 
therefore it is possible to think about an array of ways 
for workers to be represented.  I would say that the 
essential ingredient, if it is going to be successful over 
the long haul pull, is that whatever you call the 
organization that represents the inmates, that it has to 
have some independent source of power, independent from the 
system, just like the company unions didn't work because 
they didn't have an independent source of power, didn't 
even work for the companies in the long run. 
 
So I think it is possible to design a system so that you 
would have degrees of representation just like we have in 
the public sector now.  And it would be a voluntary system. 
I think it ought to be that if they want to have it and see 
that it has a role.  We develop a system to make that 
possible.  Another part of the system that I would think 
would be beneficial to everybody involved is an alternative 
dispute settlement process that would avoid litigation, or 
at least minimize litigation. 
 
MR. FREEMAN:  Yes.  It is a question for people who know 
more than I do because the obvious easy way to deal 
 
with this is to say something like there is a pretty good 
prisoner or set of prisoners.  They come work in a normal 
workplace with free labor.  They are paid the going rate. 
It is the unionized workplace.  Fine, they join the union. 
If it is not a unionized place, they have the same right to 
form a union as other people. 
But the question is, to what extent do we have through 
various work release programs prisoners working in normal, 
free settings and then going back to prison at night.  Is 
that common, frequent, or totally rare?  Could somebody 
enlighten me, please? 
 
MR. WOODHEAD:  It is extraordinarily rare, I believe.  I 
mean, if you are not counting work release. 
 
MS. SMITH:  He is counting work release.  I think that is 
pretty standard, though.  I think that depending on what 
kinds of incidents you have had, like you have had a major 
incident where someone who is out on work release went out 
and committed some offense, I mean, those programs either 
expand or constrict depending on what has happened in terms 
of the public opinion.  But that is fairly routine. 
I think that it is an interesting question because 
 
I know, for example, for inmates who work in prison 
industries, they, of course, are not considered as 
employees for purposes of discrimination laws or whatever. 
I think that is an interesting question about whether if 
somebody were on a work release program and they went out 
and they were working whether they could join a union.  And 
I wouldn't be surprised if there were some restrictions in 
terms of the department in terms of whether they could do 
that. 
 
MR. SCHWALB:  From the practical standpoint of a prison 
manager, I don't think we care what job the prisoner has on 
work release, what they make, and who they are affiliated 
with.  The reality is at the county and state level is 
where you see most of that, because the only people that 
feel comfortable enough from a public safety perspective, 
or the judge feels comfortable enough in terms of 
sanctioning options at sentencing, even putting in on work 
release, are people who are usually misdemeanors serving 
relatively short periods of time.  So as soon as you have a 
population, like at the federal system, which is 100% 
felons, it is really not an option.  But I don't see why 
from a prisoner manager standpoint, it would make any 
difference what they were affiliated with, doing on the 
outside, as long as it was legal. 
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Afternoon Small-Group Sessions 
 
After the panel (and lunch) afternoon small-group sessions identified key viewpoints and 
action recommendations from varying stakeholder perspectives.  The sessions were 
organized and assisted by professional facilitators from The Public Conversations 
Project, of Watertown, Massachusetts.  Speakers from the morning sessions were 
available for consultation. 
 
Because of (1) the wide range of stakeholders with widely differing perspectives, (2) the 
newness of the issue to many participants, (3) the novelty of the economists’ views, and 
(4) the limitations of time, goals for afternoon sessions were defined ​within​ rather than 
across ​stakeholder groups.  Participants were assigned based on registration information, 
to groups including corrections, correctional industries, corrections reform, economics, 
economic development, education and training, families, fathers, health and substance 
abuse, inmates and inmate labor, labor economics, labor unions, lawmakers, victims, 
women and children, and others. 
 
Groups were to identify (1) important features of promise in the economics of inmate 
labor, (2) principal issues of concern, and (3) key actions to be taken.   A verbatim record 
of stakeholder views is provided in the symposium transcript.  In general, groups 
emphasized the following points: 
 
Positives – Points of View or Alternatives Viewed Favorably 
 
● Most were encouraged that the economists viewed inmate employment as a good. 
● Assessing inmate employment’s minor effects on the larger economy was viewed 
favorably​, as eliminating concerns of threat to the overall society.  
● Most were encouraged that inmate employment would likely reduce recidivism. 
● Inmates’ ability to contribute to child and family support was favorably viewed. 
● Some were encouraged by the need for and emphasis on education and training. 
 
Negatives – Issues of Concern 
 
● Participants repeated concerns that the benefit of reduced recidivism through 
employment may be assumed rather than demonstrated. 
● Ignorance of prisons and of the specific components of work yielding success 
weakened the more general optimism for the posed benefits of inmate work. 
● Concerns were raised about the absence of specific implementation steps 
necessary for success. 
● Transitional and post-release adjustment issues were repeatedly raised as 
concerns, including education and training, and support in reintegrating to 
families, jobs, and communities. 
● In the symposium, the absences of participation by and attention to minorities and 
females were raised as key issues of concern. 
● Lack of attention to experiences outside the United States was raised as a serious 
concern. 





In general, participants found existing evidence on either the benefits or the costs of              
inmate employment to be fairly thin and not fully convincing and a lack of specifics in                
both the bases and recommendations for action. Therefore, the major recommendations           
for action focused on learning and research. 
 
● Both the ​measurement ​of recidivism effects of inmate employment and the 
explanation ​of the components of employment reducing recidivism need much 
more research. 
● The social processes of adjustment, including via education, need additional 
research. 
● Demonstration programs are sorely needed, in education and training, in 
employment, and in transition and community integration. 
● Effects of inmate unemployment and employment on children, families, and 
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On May 21, 1999 at the National Symposium on  “The Economics of Inmate Labor Force 
Participation,” five prominent U.S. economists provided introductory opinions on: (1) 
whether inmates participating in the labor force would be good or bad for the U.S. 
economy, (2) what would happen to civilian labor if inmates were to participate, and (3) 
their recommendations for U.S. inmate labor force policies.  
 
Although reading each economist’s opinion is necessary to gain a full appreciation of 
their conclusions, there was general agreement that - 
 
● Inmate labor force participation would be ​good​ for the U.S. economy because it 
would increase the Nation’s output of goods and services.​  Inmate employment 
would increase Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and be generally good for consumers, 
business, government and taxpayers. Inmate participation would have special 
significance for compensated victims, prisoners, and prisoners’ children and families. 
However, the overall ​economic gain would likely be small, ​because the inmate 
population is a small percentage of the U.S. workforce and inmates are, on average, 
less productive than the overall labor force. According to the economists, the increase 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would likely be small, equaling much less than 1 
percent of GDP. 
 
● The greatest social and economic benefit from inmate labor force participation 
would likely come from reduced ​future​ crime and recidivism resulting from the 
improved post-release behavior of offenders. ​The magnitude of this benefit is 
uncertain.  Moreover, in the event that lower incomes for low-wage civilians resulted 
in additional crime, the possibility of net harmful effects could not be excluded. 
 
● Inmate labor force participation would have little or no discernible effect on U.S. 
civilian labor overall, but might slightly reduce the wage rate and employment 
levels for low-wage civilian workers.​  But because inmates disproportionately come 
from lower-income populations, losses to low-wage civilians might be offset (to an 
unknown degree) by reduced crime and the positive income benefits to these same 
populations from inmate employment. 
 
● Policy Recommendations​: The roots of inefficiencies in current inmate labor and 
prison industries are: (1) the absence of a free market; and (2) rules favoring 
government-owned prison industries. Therefore, public policies in inmate labor 
and prison industries should introduce the free market and use the same rules 
for prison industries as for private industry competitors.  ​ Specifically, the 
economists generally recommended - 
 
1. Privatize prison industries or remove all competitive advantages of 
government-owned prison industries​, ​particularly-- 
● Eliminate preference in sale to government markets 
● Use open-market bidding for use of the inmate labor force 
 
2. Apply the same standards for inmates as for civilian labor, including-- 
● Identical wage standards, including application of the Federal minimum wage 
● Identical application of civilian labor law, including the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, Workers Compensation, and health and safety standards. 
 
3. Allow inmates to join unions ​or an alternative form of organization, to provide 
some representation in bargaining employment and terms 
 
4. Invest in raising inmate productivity​ with access to training, education, 
counseling, and treatment 
 
In addition, each economist offered additional comments.  Ray Marshall emphasized the 
importance of recognizing the historical context of stakeholders and issues.  Alan 
Krueger, Jeff Kling, and Steven Levitt recognized the possibility of subsidizing inmate 
labor if social benefits (such as crime reduction or reduced costs of prison operation) 
exceeded private benefits. Richard Freeman offered the alternative of inmates recapturing 
jobs previously lost to foreign firms, noting the possibility of inducing crime if low-wage 
domestic civilian labor were severely harmed. 
 
Afternoon discussion groups allowed participants and speakers to explore issues in more 
detail. In general, participants found existing evidence on the benefits or costs of inmate 
employment to be lacking and less than convincing. Therefore, their recommendations 
for action focused on learning and research: 
 
● Both the ​measurement ​of recidivism effects of inmate employment and the 
explanation ​of the components of employment reducing recidivism need much 
more research 
● The social processes of adjustment, including via education, need additional 
research 
● Demonstration programs are sorely needed, in education and training, in 
employment, and in transition and community integration. 
● Effects of inmate unemployment and employment on children, families, and 
family reintegration after release badly need research attention. 
 
The economists’ opinions are also available on www.correction.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
